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The Federal Tort Claims Act was passed by Congress in 1946
as a means of providing compensation to those injured by the negligent acts of government employees without continually imposing
upon Congress and the President the burden of "disposing of such
matters by private claim bills."1 Congress preserved the government's common law immunity from tort liability by excepting the
applicability of the Federal Tort Claims Act to any claim "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or any employee of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."2 This single statutory phrase has generated a considerable amount of case law3 and commentary.4 In
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I S. REP. No. 1196,

77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942); accord HR. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong.,

1st Sess. 2 (1946); HR. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1942); see also S. REP. No.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946) (Congress overburdened by local and private matters).
2

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).

' See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West 1965 & Supp. 1986) (annotations addressing discre-

tionary functions or duties cover forty-six pages).
4 See, e.g., Comment, Discretionand the FAA. An Overview of the Applicability of the

DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act to FAA Activity, 49 J.
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fact, the words may be shrouded in more confusion and mystique
than necessary.
The logical implication of this phrase is that liability of the
federal government must rest upon an initial determination that
no discretionary function or duty was involved in the conduct giving rise to the injury,5 and upon a second determination that the
government official acted negligently.' A two-level analysis, however, is needless at best and confusing at worst.7 The discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act contributes little to the determination of tort claims against the government that
is not already amply provided by the common law of negligence.8
The development of the law of discretionary functions or duties so
closely parallels the development of policy limitations upon tort
liability generally 9 that they are indistinguishable, except for the
143 (1983); Clark, DiscretionaryFunction and Official Immunity: Judicial Forays into Sanctuaries from Tort Liability, 16 A.F.L. REV. 33 (1974); Harris and
Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: DiscretionaryFunction Exception Revisited, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 161 (1976); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions,
77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 222 n.42, 237-38 (1963); Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Constructionof the DiscretionaryFunction Exception, 31 WAsH. L. REV. 207 (1956);
Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunctionException of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO.
L.J. 81 (1968); Zillman, The Changing Meaning of Discretion: Evolution in the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 76 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1977); Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act: The Development of the DiscretionaryFunction Exception, 13 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 535 (1983); Comment, DiscretionaryFunction Exception to Federal Tort Liability, 2 CuMSAM. L. REV.
383 (1971); Comment, Federal Tort Claims: A Critique of the PlanningLevel-Operational
Level Test, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 170 (1976); Comment, DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the
F.T.C.A.: Separation of Powers Concerns in Parole Release Decisions-Payton v. United
States, 15 GA.L. REV. 1125 (1981); Recent Developments, Defining the Government's Duty
AIR LAW AND COM.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 33 VAND. L. REV. 795 (1980).

' See Comment, Scope of the DiscretionaryFunction Exception Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act: Wright v. United States, 67 GEo. L.J. 879, 895 (1979).
6 Id. at 883 ("The Act waived the United States' immunity from suit for claims arising
out of negligent conduct of government employees.. .") (emphasis added).
7 See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 120. Concerning the discretionary function of the Federal Tort Claims Act, Reynolds states that "good arguments have been proffered that the
confusing exception should simply be abolished, leaving to the courts the task of carving out
the areas in which governmental immunity should remain. After all, if the exception is no
help to the courts in this task, and only produces immunity where there seems no sound
reason for it, we would be better off without the troublesome phrase." See id.
I See Street, Tort Liability of the State: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Crown
Proceedings Act, 47 MICH. L. REV. 341, 353 (1949) (exception restates "existing law with
regard to public officers").
General "policy limitations upon tort liability" pass under the various terminologies
of "proximate cause." See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-45
(5th ed. 1984). "'Proximate cause' . . . is merely the limitation which the courts have
placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct.. . . Some
boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some
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critical fact that a jury is given a part to play in tort claims not
made under the Federal Tort Claims Act.10 It goes too far to say
that the discretionary function exception should be repealed, special tests can be contrived to determine whether a particular decision is discretionary.
A considerable number of federal courts in federal tort claims
cases discuss whether discretionary functions or duties are present
when they could just as easily discuss whether the government
owed a particular plaintiff a duty, acted unreasonably, or inflicted
an injury of a sort that is compensable under tort law.1" In all such
cases, the issue of government liability in torts cases has come
down to a question of the proper allocation of losses, the same
question that is presented in every tort case. The judgment that a
court must exercise in making this allocation .of losses is similar to
that which must be exercised by a court in deciding to send a case
to a jury rather than to direct a verdict for the defendant or to
grant summary judgment.
Initially, this article will discuss some basic principles that define the scope of negligence liability. A comparison of developments in specific areas of conduct will be made between cases
brought against private defendants and those brought against the
government. The article will conclude that these developments are
essentially the same and that little is gained, therefore, by stating
that discretionary functions must be examined when tort claims
are made against the government. The leading cases of the United
States Supreme Court in which the discretionary function exception was a factor will be reviewed, emphasizing the Court's treatment of discretion in terms applicable to all negligence claims. It
will be observed that the tests for the discretionary function that
court interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act has generated,
while useful in some instances, have come up short as devices to
inform whether discretion is present. A finding of discretion in fact
turns only upon the ability 6f a court to evaluate the government's
conduct against an objective standard of negligence. Beyond this,
it is not possible to conceive a more sophisticated test of discresocial idea of justice or policy." Id. at 264.
20

28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982) (no right to jury in claims brought under Federal Tort

Claims Act).
" See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 164 (discussing elements of
negligence cause of action). Failure to prove any one of prima facie elements of a negligence
case would cause its dismissal. Id. at 164-65.
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tion. In light of the fact that negligence cases do not generally arise
from planned transactions, this is really neither surprising nor particularly alarming.
I.

GENERAL POLICY LIMITATIONS UPON TORT LIABILITY

Tort law functions as a means of allocating losses that arise
out of human activities. 1 2 In negligence law, losses are allocated in
accordance with various stated determinative factors including,
among others, whether defendant acted in accordance with an objective standard of care and whether the acts of defendant were
the legal cause of plaintiff's injury. No one factor necessarily provides the exclusive rationale for a court's denial of liability. Moreover, the statement that a particular factor applies in a given case
may in fact mask the fact that a policy is controlling.
A. Standard of Care
Tort law will shift a loss from the plaintiff to the defendant
only if the defendant's conduct has created an unreasonable risk of
injury. 13
[T]he standard of conduct which is the basis of the law of negligence is usually determined upon a risk-benefit form of analysis:
by balancing the risk, in the light of the social value of the interest threatened, and the probability and extent of the harm,
against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued. 4
Judge Learned Hand expressed a quantification of unreasonable
conduct in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 1 5 If the probability
of injury occurring be called P; the gravity of the injury L; and the
burden or cost to the defendant of adequate precautions to avert
the injury B; "liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL."' ' This formula, if it could be
rigorously applied in all circumstances, would create efficiency" by
"exploiting economic resources in such a way that 'value' Id. at 6.
13 Id. at 169.
14 Id. at 173.
12

'

159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).

,0 Id. at 173. Frequent reference will be made to B, P, and L, as defined by Judge
Learned Hand, throughout this article.
17 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.2-6.3 at 122-23 (2d ed. 1977).
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human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services - is maximized."18 Unfortunately, the three variables (B, P, and L) are rarely susceptible to
precise quantification."' It is possible, however, to ascribe relative
values to B and to the product PL in order to apply the formula.
The formula's value is that it directs the thinking of the factfinder, even if it cannot be used to evaluate the reasonableness of a
course of conduct with certainty. It is the fact-finder who in effect
ascribes relative values to these immeasurable variables.2 0 Of
course, any time a court makes a determination of negligence, it
has implicitly recognized that it is indeed competent to make a
judgment of the relative values of B and PL. Negligence will hereinafter include those occasions when B < PL.
It should be observed that the values ascribed to B, P, and L
are subject to change over time. Hence, conduct that does not entail an unreasonable risk of injury at one point in time might later
create an unreasonable risk of harm.2 1
A second observation is that there will be occasions when the
relative values to be ascribed to B and PL are so immeasurable,
indeed imponderable, that no evaluation of an appropriate standard of care is possible. Such an occasion arises - in the view of
some state courts - in cases in which it is alleged that a parent
should be liable for the "negligent" supervision of his child. One
example is the case of Holodook v. Spencer,2 2 in which infant
Holodook was injured when struck by an automobile driven by de18Id. at

10 (emphasis original).

I Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
Cf. id. at 612 (choice consigned to jury).

20

21

Compare Wohlert v. Siebert, 23.Pa. Super. 213, 215 (1903) (glaucoma detectable only

by specialist with special equipment and special skills) with Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d
514, 518, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974) (test for diagnosing glaucoma simple and relatively inexpensive); compare Davison v. Snohomish County, 149 Wash. 109, 113-14, 270 P. 422, 423-24

(1928) (not unreasonable for county to fail to line elevated roads with railing sufficiently
strong to prevent automobile from sliding through it) with Bartlett v. Northern Pac. Ry., 74
Wash. 2d 881, 882-83, 447 P.2d 735, 737 (1968) (summary judgment for defendant improper
on facts similar to Davison).
22 43 App. Div. 2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324
N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). But see Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51
Hawaii 484, 487, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1969) (rationale of preservation of family harmony

and tranquility underlying parental tort immunity baseless justification to deny redress to
aggrieved child); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 261-62, 201 N.W.2d 825, 832 (1972)

(parent's negligence not shielded by narrowed parental immunity); Thoreson v. Milwaukee
& Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 246-47, 201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972) (mother's

failure to warn child of dangers of venturing onto busy streets not immune).
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fendant. Holodook's father brought an action against defendant,
who counterclaimed and commenced a third-party action against
Holodook's mother for indemnification, contending that the parents' "lack of attention, care and control of. . .[their] son was the
proximate cause of the accident and resulting injuries. 'z3 The par-

ents' motion to dismiss these claims was denied by Special Term. 4
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the defendant's
right to indemnification would depend upon the existence of a legal duty owed by the parents to their son 25 and that such a duty
did not exist. The reasons for such a conclusion include the difficulty of measuring the relative values of B and PL in the context
of parental supervision of a child.
The duty to supervise a child in his daily activities has as its objective the fostering of physical, emotional and intellectual development, and is one whose enforcement can depend only on love.
Each child is different, as is each parent.... [T]here are so many

combinations and permutations of parent-child relationships that
may result that the search for a standard would necessarily be in
vain - and properly so. Supervision is uniquely a matter for the
exercise of judgment .... Unfortunately, it is only when injury

occurs that that judgment will be called into question - and the
parents themselves will be the first to do so. Surely there can be
no place in such a natural scheme for second-guessing by a jury
whose members' views on the subject will be unavoidably influenced by their own unique
and inimitable experiences, both as
26
children and parents.

When the relative values of B and PL cannot be assessed - even
by hunch or preference by a court's fact-finder - then the necessary implication is that the actor is free to make his own choices
without fear of later being found not to have performed in accordance with the appropriate standard of care. The actor has, in a
word, discretion. The presence of such discretion means that there
can be no review of the actor's actions.
13

Holodook, 43 App. Div. 2d at 130-31, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 200.

24 Id. at 131, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 200-01.
25 Id. at 131-32, 138, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 201, 207.
26

1979).

Id. at 135, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 204-05; accord Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682, 684 (Del.

27 Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) ("discretion" as used in Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701). In Overton Park, the
United States Supreme Court noted that discretion exists when there is no law to apply. Id.
at 410. The standard enunciated in Overton Park to define "discretion" is similar to the
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In areas in which the relative values of B and PL are so immeasurable that courts give actors discretion to make whatever
judgments they wish, there nevertheless remains the possibility
that the variables B, P, and L will not forever be perceived as immeasurable. In such cases, it should be expected that courts will
reach decisions that withhold the discretion previously accorded
actors. This occurs, for example, when a court recognizes that a
claim can be stated for negligent infliction of mental distress. The
language of the courts in such cases is neither that of a standard of
care nor that of B, P, or L; rather it is that of duty. But beneath
the language of duty lies the fact that courts must be willing to
attempt to measure the appropriate standard of care in a situation
in which they were not previously so willing.
In Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 28 plaintiff witnessed the defendants run over her seventeen-month old son with
a truck. She brought an action seeking damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the California Supreme Court affirmed. The court expressed concern about the considerable administrative problems
that could arise with the recognition of such a claim.29 It would be
difficult to prove, for example, that the injury of mental distress
had indeed been caused by the acts of the defendant.30 If a court
cannot make even the roughest assessment of the value of the L
element of the negligence formula, then the formula simply cannot
be applied and discretion follows. Nevertheless, "simply because
'naivete about the problem of proof has caused injustice in times
past does not necessarily settle the matter for the future' ...."31
Only five years after having expressed doubt in the courts' administrative capacity to handle cases of negligently inflicted emotional distress, the California Supreme Court decided the case of
Dillon v. Legg,32 which was factually similar to Amaya. The court
noted the frequently advanced and frequently rejected argument
that courts would be unable to discern adequate proof of causaone enunciated by the appellate division in Holodook. See Holodook, 43 App. Div. 2d at 135,
350 N.Y.S.2d at 204-05.
28 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
29 Id. at 310-13, 379 P.2d at 522-24, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42-44.
Id. at 311, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
'1 Id. at 311-12, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43 (quotingSmith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 285
(1944)).
32 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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tion, to sift the fraudulent claims from the meritorious claims.33
The Dillon court noted that courts are just as capable of deciding
this type of case as they are of deciding many other types of cases
in which they do not confess inability to determine the magnitude
34
of L.
In the five years that elapsed between Amaya and Dillon, the
values to be ascribed to B, P, and L did not undergo a sudden
transformation. Rather, from an analytical standpoint, the Dillon
court was willing to measure in some manner the relative values of
B and PL. When courts decide that they are able to review the
actions of a defendant to determine whether losses should be
shifted from plaintiff to defendant, they do so, and discretion is
correspondingly reduced.
B. "Proximate Cause"
"Proximate cause" is the short-hand phrase which a court may
use to limit the liablility of a defendant who, through his conduct,
has caused injury to a plaintiff. 5 Limitations are placed upon the
liability of a defendant for reasons of policy, so that losses that
have been incurred will not always be reallocated from the plaintiff
to the defendant.36 The phrase "proximate cause" is a poor choice
for expressing this limitation function because the doctrine does
not describe a rule of causation or a rule of proximity. More appropriate phrases would be "legal cause" or "responsible cause." 31
Courts handle questions of legal causation through at least two approaches: the foreseeability approach and the direct causation (or
directly traceable consequences) approach. 8
1. Foreseeability Approach. - Under the foreseeability approach, liability for negligence is limited "to the scope of the original risk created, with the test of responsibility for the result identical with the test for negligence. 3 9 The foreseeability test has been
restated in terms of duty, the important point being that a duty is
3 Id. at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.

See id. at 737-38, 441 P.2d at 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79 (courts have already
decided many other types of cases in which similar argument was advanced).
" W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 273.
',

36
37

Id.
Id.

'a W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS

1982).
'9 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 281 (footnote omitted).

364-65 (7th ed.
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owed only to the plaintiff who is foreseeable. 40 "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports
relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. ' ' 4 1 By conceptualizing the problem as one of duty, the issue of causation is avoided altogether.42
The forseeability approach offers little in the way of certainty
in determining how losses should be allocated. Stating issues in
terms of forseeability may eliminate the need for reference to causation as an issue, but it does nothing to help eliminate the fundamental question of how liability is to be limited. 43 "[L]egal duties
are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed
for damage done. '44 Whether a duty exists is really dependent
upon several factors, such as, "the hand of history, our ideas of
morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the rule,
and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall. '45 Duty is "a
legal device . . . designed to curtail the feared propensities of juries toward liberal awards. '46 This curtailment occurs because the
47
initial question of whether there is a duty is one for the court,
whose role in this analysis is actually greater than judges who give
40

Id. at 284.

41

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (citation

omitted).
42 See id. at 346, 162 N.E. at 101 (question of liability anterior to question of measure
of consequences accompanying liability).
43 W. PROSSER & IV. KEETON, supra note 9, at 287 ("unlimited liability is plainly unjustified, and this approach does nothing to solve the problem of a place to stop short of infinite liability").
4
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976).
41 Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. Rxv. 1, 15 (1953); see also W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 9, at 287 ("The real problem... would seem to be one of social policy.
whether the defendants in such cases should bear the heavy negligence losses of a complex
civilization, rather than the individual plaintiff").
16 Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968).
47 See W. PROSSER & W. KF-TON, supra note 9, at 236. The federal courts of appeals
maintain that the existence of a legal duty is for the court to determine as a matter of law.
See, e.g., Carrier v. Riddell Inc., 721 F.2d 867, 868 (1st Cir. 1983)(as a matter of law court
found defendant did not breach a duty); Rubs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1271
(10th Cir. 1982)(determination of defendant's duty under particular circumstances is a matter of law for the court); Welch v. Heat Research Group Corp., 644 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir.
1981) (court correctly ruled defendant breached no duty as a matter of law).
The Restatement has reiterated this procedure by stating that it is for the courts to
decide whether the facts give rise to a legal duty. See RESTATEhMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
328 B(b) (1977).
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all cases to juries.4 8 To the extent that a court determines that
there is no duty, the defendant has discretion.
The allocation of losses is accomplished by the appropriate
definition of duty. Foreseeability has proved to be a very elastic
concept - one that really has not so much to do with prevision as
it has to do with policy. Foreseeable risks can be defined narrowly
or they can be defined broadly "as seems appropriate and just in
the special type of case."'4 9 Duty imports relation, 5 and relations
change. As relations change, or are perceived to have changed, or
are perceived differently by different courts, duties change. Duties
can be expanded or contracted. Thus the person who is struck by
the flying body of another person, who was struck by a negligently
driven vehicle, may be deemed by some courts to be an unforesee51
able plaintiff and by other courts to be a foreseeable plaintiff.
Few judges would impose liability on one who had negligently
knocked down a bridge over the Buffalo River, causing delay in the
arrival of a doctor. 52 But when the negligent derailment of a train
blocks a crossing and causes delay in getting a seriously ill person
to a hospital by automobile and such delay could have contributed
to the ill person's death, a jury should be permitted to pass upon
whether or not the death was foreseeable.5 3
Recent developments in tort law manifest a changing relation
between those with power and those without it. Those with "political, economic, intellectual, [and] physical" 54 power will find that
more remedies exist for the abuse of that power than did previously.5 5 Increasingly, courts are confronted with "the question of
what defendants representing significant clusters of different kinds
of power owe to our civilization in the way of behaving in a
civilized manner. ' ' 56 This trend reflects the elasticity of
"foreseeability."
2. Direct Causation Approach. - Under the so-called direct
causation approach, liability for negligence is limited to conse4 L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 122-31 (1927).
4 Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610 (1st Cir. 1955).
5oProsser, PalsgrafRevisited, supra note 45, at 13.
51 See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 324 n.7.
5'In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
Hall v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 504 F.2d 380, 382, 384 (5th Cir. 1974).
Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70's, 22 STAN. L. REv. 330, 333
(1970).
15 Id. at 333-35.
56 Id. at 335 (footnote omitted).
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quences that are directly, rather than indirectly, caused by the
negligent act of the defendant.5 This approach is arbitrary and
artificial, since it usually cannot be stated with certainty whether a
new force actually intervened or was simply a part of the landscape
in which the defendant acted. 5 Fantastic results can be directly
traced to a negligent act. 59 The problem, of course, is that limitation of liability is a matter of policy and not susceptible to a
mechanical solution.6 0
Application of the direct causation approach can lead either to
expansive or contracted impositions of liability, and the results can
change over time. Thus, the negligent motorist who caused a vehicle to collide with a power pole, thereby affecting the flow of power
to a business that suffered economic loss, was held by one court
not liable as a matter of law,6 ' while another court later upheld
liability for such "natural, logical, and foreseeable" consequences.62
The subsequent suicide of one negligently injured by another has
been deemed to be a superseding cause of death by some courts,
and not a superseding cause of death by other courts. Under the
direct causation approach, as under the others, losses are allocated
on the basis of a policy choice rather than on the basis of a test
that can be applied mechanically and with certainty.
C. Other Determinitive Factors
Courts can employ any number of approaches in determining
the proper allocation of losses, and such approaches, of course, are
not limited to those already noted. A court may simply decide, for
reasons quite satisfactory to itself, that the type of unreasonable
conduct of a defendant simply is not the type for which liability
64
should be imposed, such as negligent infliction of mental distress,
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
56 Id. at 294-95.

supra note 9, at 293-94.

Id. at 295.

60 Id. at 294-95.

, Geo. D. Barnard Co. v. Lane, 392 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez, 92 Cal. App. 3d 963, 968, 155 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340
(1979).
62

See Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 311, 322-24 § 4; W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS
362-63 notes 2-4 (7th ed. 1982).
0 See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 359-66 (citing cases in
which no liability imposed but also mentioning cases holding otherwise); Miller, The Scope
of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit
the Crime," 1 U. HAWAIn L. REv. 1, 3-9, 16-20 (1979) (discussing recent trends and policy
considerations); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence
11

CASES AND MATERIALS
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negligent infliction of prenatal injuries,65 or the failure to act in
various circumstances. 6 Similarly, a court may decide that damages should not be awarded for certain types of injury, such as attorney's fees, 67 reduced life expectancy,6 8 or economic loss when
there is no personal injury or property loss. 9 Considerations of
policy, rather than application of meaningful tests of liability, lead
to such conclusions.
D. Policy Limitations on Negligence Liability
The precise factors that affect liability determination in common law negligence cases defy complete articulation. The common
law of negligence, however, does function in a manner that can be
regarded as satisfactory. Over time, some fact patterns do recur
and courts become accustomed to dealing with them. These fact
patterns arise, for example, in automobile cases, defective products
cases, and landowner liability cases. As a result of these recurring
patterns, a satisfactory degree of consistency has developed from
case to case. It should also be noted that negligence cases are "factintensive", that is, much depends on the findings of fact. Some of
those facts have determinitive legal implications, for example, a
finding of unreasonable conduct of a party. If such findings are
shielded from intensive outside scrutiny, such as by having a jury
render a general verdict subject to review only upon the question
of whether substantial evidence supports the verdict, an illusory
degree of consistency is achieved from one case to the next. While
Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982) (discussing California case law).
65 See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 484-86, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903-05, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65, 69-71 (1969) (discussing reasons for preventing recovery). But see W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 370 n.32 (citing cases allowing recovery for wrongful death of
stillborn fetus). See generally Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies,46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349 (1971) (discerning trend allowing recovery for
prenatal injury).

66See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 322, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (1959) (no duty to aid
one drowning); Randolph's Adm'r v. Snyder, 139 Ky. 159, 161, 129 S.W. 562, 563 (1910) (no

duty of physician to answer call of dying person); Riley v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry.,
160 S.W. 595, 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (no duty to aid one bleeding to death).
67 See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.8 (1973) (stating
general rule that prevailing party in litigation is not entitled to attorneys' fees); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914(1) (1977) (damages for tort action "do not ordinarily
include compensation for attorney fees").
68 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 542 n.4 (discussing
general rule and policy issues keeping it extant); D. DOBBS, supra note 67, at 549 (discussing

American rule against recovery).
69 See Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
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this consistency may be illusory, the means of achieving it have
proved sufficiently palliative that the torts process as it presently
exists has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to endure.
II. A

COMPARISON OF FACT PATTERNS IN WHICH DISCRETION IS

AN ISSUE IN CASES ARISING UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
ACT WITH COMPARABLE FACT PATTERNS IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE
CASES

The following is an examination of a number of fact patterns
in cases in which the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act was construed.70 These fact patterns will be
compared with the fact patterns of comparable ordinary negligence
cases in which the government was not a defendant.7 1 The purpose
of this comparison is to demonstrate the parallel development of
liability limitations in these areas. It will be observed that analysis
of cases for the presence of discretion in a government official does
little to alter the pattern of liability that would have occurred if
the defendant had been a private party and the case had been one
of ordinary common law negligence. 2
A. Freedom from Contract
At common law, an individual has the freedom to contract or
not to contract. No liability will be imposed on an individual or an
entity for not entering into a contract except in special circum70 The facts of many negligence cases can be characterized in different ways. For exam-

ple, one observer may see a case as involving the question of whether there has been negligent performance of an activity undertaken, while another observer may see the same case
as involving the question of whether a duty arises from the act of inspection. No effort is
made to characterize each case in every manner possible. Rather it is simply acknowledged
that this is an inherent characteristic of negligence cases.
No claim is made that every court decision in which 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) was construed
is included in this analysis. Nor is it claimed that every aspect of tort law is exhaustively
examined; rather, each area is considered only to the extent necessary to demonstrate the
convergence of common law limitations on negligence liability and interpretations of the
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
7' In this article, reference to the "government" refers to whatever federal entity is the
defendant in a suit. It is also assumed that all legal obstacles to a suit such as presentation
to and rejection by the appropriate federal agency have been cleared. See 28 U.S.C. §
2675(a) (1982).
72 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982) provides several exceptions to liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. For purposes of isolating analysis of the discretionary function exception,
these exceptions will be ignored.
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7 The same is true of the federal government. It does not
stancess.
have to enter into a contract that it does not wish to enter, and
there should be no liability for such a refusal. But the cases in
which this point could be dispositive are frequently resolved, at
least in part, under the heading of discretion; a determination is
made that there is no liability because the refusal to enter a contract constitutes discretionary conduct.
Thus the government has the discretion, in the sale of lands or
other properties, to accept or reject any offers it deems proper. 7
Awarding a government contract to one person instead of another
is described as a discretionary act because a number of factors are
considered in making such a decision. 5 Such discretion exists even
if the reasons for not entering a contract with the plaintiff are
based on inaccurate information. 7 6 The government has discretion
with respect to whom it hires, 7 7 and to whom it loans money. 8 It
also has the discretion to do business with as many persons as it

7 Austin v. Burge, 156 Mo. App. 286, 289, 137 S.W. 618, 618 (1911). "It is certain that
one cannot be forced into contractual relations with another. . ." Id. Even when a federal
statute creates a process of contract formation and creates the means by which the identity
of parties to a contract is determined, it would be most unusual - aside from certain wellknown exceptions such as obligations imposed upon common carriers or the obligation not
to discriminate on the basis of race - to compel one to enter a contract he does not wish to
enter. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102, 108 (1970) (NLRB without
authority to prescribe terms of collective bargaining agreement, even to remedy refusal to
bargain in good faith).
7' Santoni v. FDIC, 508 F. Supp. 1012, 1015-16 (D.P.R. 1981), aff'd, 677 F.2d 174, 179
(1st Cir. 1982).
7 See, e.g., Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1256 (2d
Cir. 1975) (failure of Postal Service to renew contracts for star routes involved consideration
of past performance, nature of routes, cost, and public interest); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc.
v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (awarding contract to party arguably not in
compliance with contract requirements involved consideration of degree of deviance from
contract requirements and whether to hold new bidding, thus discretionary), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 910 (1976); Taxay v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.D.C. 1972) (failure
to renew appointment as FAA physician involved consideration of qualifications and thus
discretionary), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Madison v. United States, 679
F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 1982) (negligent award of government contract immune within discretionary function exception).
71 See Myers & Myers v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1257 (2d Cir. 1975)
(failure of postal service to renew contracts for star routes).
'7 See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Utah 1979) (discretionary
function one ground for dismissal of plaintiff's claim of failure of post office to hire him); cf.
Garst v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 427, 428-29 (E.D. Va. 1978) (supervisory decisions in
employment relationship discretionary).
7'8 See, e.g., Tuepker v. Farmers Home Admin., 538 F. Supp. 375, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(eligibility for Farmer's Home Administration loan matter of discretion), afl'd, 708 F.2d
1329 (8th Cir. 1983).
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wishes unless it expressly agrees otherwise, even if this makes a
deal less profitable than anticipated. 79 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has wide discretion to grant or not to grant an
application for insurance.80
In the situations noted above, the government's obligations
would not change if the discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act did not exist. No statutory exception is
necessary to give an individual the right to accept the offer he
wishes to accept and to reject all others. No statutory exception is
necessary to empower one to choose, for whatever reason, with
whom he will do business. The statute establishes nothing new in
the law insofar as hiring employees, selecting lendees, or insuring a
business is concerned. In short, it does not alter the government's
freedom not to enter into a contract.
B. Interference with Prospective Advantage
At common law, a prospective commercial advantage is protected when a certain degree of security in the commercial relationship is warranted. The performance of a contract is protected
from intentional and improper interference,' but not from negligent interference.8 2 Likewise one's interest in a prospective contractual relation is protected from intentional and improper interference, 3 but not from negligent interference." Whether an
interference is "improper" depends on a number of factors, including the nature of the interferer's conduct, the motive of the interferer, the interest of the plaintiff affected, the interest which the
interferer advances, the social interest in protecting the interferer's
70 See United States v. Sherman Gardens Co., 298 F. Supp. 1332, 1334 (D. Nev. 1967)
(comparable loans to competitors).
80 See Magellsen v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (D. Mont.
1972).
81 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 978; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 766, 766A (1979) ("intentionally and improperly" inducing non-performance or
building performance actionable).
82 See IV. PROSSER & W. KELTON, supra note 9, at 982; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 776c (1979) (negligence causing nonperformance, hindered performance or prospective performance not actionable).
83 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 1008; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979) (inducing person not to contract or preventing person from
acquiring the prospective interest actionable).
8' See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at 1008; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979) (negligent interference with contractual relationship not
actionable).
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freedom to act compared with the contractual interest, the proximity of the interferer's conduct to the actual interference, and the
relationship between the parties.8s
There have been many instances in which persons with governmentally impaired commercial expectancies have brought an
action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. ss The federal courts are often asked to determine whether the
governmental agent was performing a discretionary function. The
liability of the United States in these cases, however, could as easily have turned on whether the conduct of its agents was intentional or negligent, or whether the intentional conduct was proper
or improper; the outcome of these cases would not have been different. In some cases, the interference of a government agent or
official was deemed discretionary, and hence immune from liabil87
ity; yet the conduct examined was not intentional, but negligent.
In other cases, the conduct of the government official was not improper under the factors noted above, yet the court determined
that a discretionary act was being performed. Certainly if a statute
gives a governmental agency the discretion to act in such a manner
that it upsets a private party's commercial expectancy, the statute
itself manifests the presence of (1) a substantial interest of the
agency and (2) a substantial interest in protecting the agency's
freedom of action. Thus, irrespective of the existence of the Federal Tort Claims Act, there would be no action for intentional interference. It adds little to say that the acts of the governmental
agency were discretionary.8 8
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
88 Naturally, no plaintiff is going to allege directly that an act of the United States has

interfered with a contract, for that would lead to immediate dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h) (1982). However, the interests of plaintiffs in the cases examined herein are in the
nature of expectancies with which the government has interfered.
87 See, e.g., Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's allegation of negligent regulation and supervision of bank holding company within discretionary
function exception), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d
977, 979 (10th Cir. 1979) (denial of grazing permit in accordance with statutory policy as
discretionary and not actionable); Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Natl Bank, 559
F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1977) (Federal Reserve Bank's failure to disclose bank's desperate
financial plight discretionary), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
88Cf. J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1975)
(backpay lost because of NLRB delay in seeking enforcement of order yet Board immune
from liability), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329,
1337 (5th Cir. 1973) (negligent taking of property by FBI pursuant to investigation not actionable) (dictum); Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1011 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (plaintiff's claim would be dismissed either on discretionary function exception or
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When an interference is intentional and improper, the discretionary function vanishes as an impediment to liability, even
though consideration of the function does not.89 Knowing interference with another's expectancy by refusing to follow an agency's
own regulations would be improper 0 There is no discretion to interfere with the rights of those with whom the government has
elected to be tenants in common.9 1 There is no discretion to construct a dam and thereby divert water where the plaintiff has
rights previously established by court decree.92 The existence of
the discretionary function does not alter the outcomes of cases involving government interference with a prospective advantage. The
results would be the same under the common law.
C. Law Enforcement Activities
The common law recognizes the existence of several privileges
when law enforcement activities are at issue. 3 There is a privilege
to use force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to suppress a riot that itself threatens death or serious bodily harm. 4
There is a privilege "to interfere with person or property under
legal process. . . so long as the warrant or writ to be served is 'fair
on its face.' -95 The server of legal process "is required to know at
least the superficial characteristics of a valid warrant ..
96 He
general tort theory).
Cf. Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738, 740-41 (10th Cir. 1949) (government aware
that plaintiff entitled to exclusive grazing permits so no discretion to grant grazing permits
to others). "No government employee is granted the discretion whether he shall induce or
incite third persons to interfere with exclusive rights or privileges granted by the United
States." Id. at 740. Compare Kunzler v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D. Utah 1961)
(Oman distinguished because no exclusive right to permit), appeal dismissed per curiam
mem., 307 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1962).
90 Cf. Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (Forest Service failure to
follow regulations for destruction of property not discretionary), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103
(1983). A determination of "propriety" is avoided simply by holding that such interference
is not discretionary. See, e.g., Gross v. United States, 676 F.2d 295, 302-03 (8th Cir. 1982)
(no discretion to deny participation in feed grain program); Donohue v. United States, 437
F. Supp. 836, 841 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (acts not at policy-making level).
91 See Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 1982) (government repudiation of duties as cotenant with depositors of grain not within discretionary function
exception).
92 See Ellison v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 18, 20-21 (D. Nev. 1951).
93 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 112-145 (1965).
See id. at § 142(2).
See IV. PROSSER & W. K- ON, THE LAW OF TORTS 148-49 (1984).
See id. at 149.
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may not depart from proper procedures nor may he arrest the
wrong person or seize the wrong property. 97 He must have the process in his possession.98
The common law can be applied to law enforcement activities
of the federal government with an appropriate degree of immunity
provided the United States without reliance on the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Nevertheless
cases involving the government are not resolved by applying the
common law, but by making a finding concerning discretion. There
is no discretion to use force likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm for the prupose of suppressing a riot. 99 There is no discretion
to depart from procedures prescribed by federal law for the destruction of plaintiffs' chattels by government agents. 100 There is
no discretion to send inaccurate messages based on inadequate
knowledge for the purpose of procuring an arrest.101 There is no
discretion to seize property without a warrant.10 2 On the other
hand, in the absence of negligence, the United States is not liable
for damage to personal property occurring in the course of an FBI
10 3
investigation of a presidential assassination.
The common law of malicious prosecution gives an absolute
privilege to the public prosecutor. 0 4 One would expect that the actions that must be taken prior to prosecution such as investigation
would also be immune. This is the pattern that has emerged from
cases decided under the Federal Tort Claims Act, except that immunity is granted, at least in part, on the basis of the statute's
discretionary function exception rather than on the basis of the
common law.
The decision to investigate (or not to investigate) or to prose:7

Id. at 150.

98

Id.

9 Smith v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 867, 869-70 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (discretion; court
recognizes common law privilege anyway).
'0a Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181 (1956) (rounding up plaintiff-Indians'
horses without notice and opportunity to remove horses from rangeland as required by Federal Range Code).
101 See Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 775, 777 (D.C Cir. 1979) (United States National Central Bureau, Department of Treasury; message sent to Interpol to procure arrest
in Germany).
10 See DeBonis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 123, 125 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (seizure of
auto by tax agents without warrant; no discretion and failure to exercise due care).
"I1See Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1337 (5th Cir. 1973).
'0' W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 1058 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 656 (1977).
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cute (or not to prosecute) a case' 0 5 particularly one that involves
06
issues of national policy such as civil rights, is discretionary
Such issues should not be entrusted to resolution through private
litigation, for the Constitution entrusts such decisions to other government branches. 10 7 The decision when to arrest a bank robber
and the plan to be used to effectuate the arrest are discretionary. 08
The decision to utilize the service of informants' 9 and the choice
of a communications system to be used between those informants
and the government contacts are discretionary." 0 The policy decision to implement a Witness Protection Program is discretionary,"' as is the selection of a person for the program,""2 the decision to use relocation as the primary means of implementing the
program," 3 and the determination not to supervise the relocated
4
witness constantly."
In such cases, even without the discretionary function exception, courts would not intervene because there is no way in which
they could assess the relative values of B, P, and L. If the relative
values of B, P, and L could be assessed, a couart might be more
willing to intervene." 5 The decision to send an informant on a par"' Grunnet v. United States, 730 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1984) (several decisions to
investigate practices of People's Temple in Jonestown, Guyana discretionary); Gray v. Bell,
712 F.2d 490, 513-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1593 (1984) (decision whether
to prosecute discretionary; implementation of decision immune); Schmidt v. United States,
198 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 896 (1952) (SEC decision to investigate);
Heywood v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 590, 591 (D. Mass. 1984) (decision whether to prosecute discretionary); Houston v. Silbert, 514 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 681 F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (decision whether to institute criminal proceeding); Bub Davis Packing Co. v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 589, 594 (W.D. Tex. 1977),
aff'd per curiam, 584 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979) (Department of Agriculture decision to investigate for violation of Meat Inspection Act
discretionary).
100 Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967).
107 Id. See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1593 (1984).
'ts Amato v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 863, 866 (D.N.J. 1982), afl'd mem., 729 F.2d
1445 (3d Cir. 1984).
10' Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 931 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
10 Slagle v. United States, 612 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1980).
"' Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 539 F. Supp. 949, 953 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 702 F. Supp. 710
(8th Cir. 1983).
122 Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 794 (8th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 795.
114

Id.

Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1233 (2d Cir. 1982) (negligent INS determination of citizenship of one entering country). Contra DePass v. United States, 479 F. Supp
115
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ticular mission is not discretionary.1 1 6 Negligent implementation of
the Witness Protection Program so that interference with the
rights of a non-custodial parent occurs is not discretionary. 117 The
results of all the cases noted here would still be obtained in the
absence of a statutory exception for the exercise of a discretionary
function.
D. Duty to Provide Police Protection to Individuals
An individual injured through the violent conduct of another
may seek recovery from the sovereign whose obligation it is to provide police protection. There is a strong inclination, however, to
hold that providing police protection to the public does not create
a duty to protect any one individual from harm. 118 The court-created doctrine of "duty to all, duty to no one" is the common law
equivalent of a statutory exception of discretionary acts from tort
liability under a tort claims statute, because the duty analysis and
the statutory exception serve the same policy interests.1 1 9 Even in
the sphere of a distinctly governmental activity, such as providing
police protection, competing policies have subjected the contour of
legal duties to reexamination and change.' 20 The same process of
reexamination and change is found in the federal courts' recent
considerations of the term "discretion" in cases involving individual protection.
The tension that exists in the common law in this area is illustrated in the majority and dissenting opinions in the case of Riss v.
City of New York.' 2 ' For six months, plaintiff in Riss had pleaded
with the police for protection from a would-be suitor who had persistently threatened her. After she was eventually assaulted, plaintiff brought an action against the City of New York for failure to
373, 376-77 (D. Mo. 1979).
116 See Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923, 932 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (informant in

automobile from which shots fired that killed civil rights marcher; automobile occupied by
members of Ku Klux Klan).
1H7 Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 539 F. Supp. 949, 953 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 702 F. Supp. 710
(8th Cir. 1983).
"
See W. PROSSER & W. KEEON, supra note 9, at 1049-50.
See id. at 1049 n.81.
120 See Recent Cases, 30 VAND. L. REV. 295, 302 (1977) (by dropping requirement of
special relationship, Supreme Court of Alaska eliminated "duplication of effort that could
only cause confusion").
121 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
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provide special protection. i2 The trial court dismissed the complaint and both the appellate division and the court of appeals of
New York affirmed, indicating that the judiciary should not be the
governing body that indirectly determines how limited police resources are spent. 123 Since courts simply are not equipped with the
wisdom necessary to dictate police budgets, 2 4 such decisions
25
should be made by other departments of government.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Keating was much more willing to analyze the case under the negligence concept. He noted
that "[t]o say that there is no duty is, of course, to start with the
conclusion.' 26 Judge Keating rejected the factual conclusion that
limitless liability will ensue from holding the city liable in a case
such as this. 127 Rather than creating a specter of unlimited strict
liability, Judge Keating's approach would limit the liability of a
governmental entity for the failure of the police to protect the citizens through such traditional negligence concepts as fault, proximate cause, or foreseeability. 2 s When threats such as those made
in this case become real and foreseeable, liability should be imposed for failure to take any measures to avoid the consequences. 29 The denial of a court's ability or wisdom to evaluate
liability in such situations eventually encourages irresponsibility
by other governmental departments. 30 Losses that should properly
be assessed to the city are externalized and imposed upon persons
31
such as the plaintiff.'
The competing policies identified in the Riss majority and dissenting opinions are the freedom of police departments to allocate
scarce resources in the manner they deem appropriate and the reallocation of a loss when the burden of avoiding it has clearly become less than its magnitude discounted by the probability of its
not occurring. These are the same policies that compete in any
negligence case. A court should allow a police department to allocate scarce resources as it sees fit when it simply is not possible to
2 Id. at 583-84, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900 (Keating, J., dissenting).
1223See id., at 582-83, 240 N.E.2d at 860-61, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
124See id. at 582, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
2 See id. at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
2 See id. at 585, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (Keating, J., dissenting).
227

Id. at 585-86, 240 N.E.2d at 862-63, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (Keating, J., dissenting).

128See id. at 586, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Keating, J., dissenting).
121See id. at 587, 240 N.E.2d at 864, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Keating, J., dissenting).

10 See id., 240 N.E.2d at 864, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (Keating, J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 590, 240 N.E.2d at 865-66, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Keating, J., dissenting).
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reach any conclusion concerning whether B is less than PL. Correspondingly, the police department has discretion in such matters.
But when a court is competent to determine that B is less than PL,
a duty can be found and the scope of discretion narrows. Judge
Keating sub silentio perceived on the part of the courts a greater
competence to assess the relative values of B and PL.
Liability determinations made by federal courts under the
Federal Tort Claims Act are essentially consistent with this resolution of competing policies. An increasing willingness on the part of
federal courts to determine the relative values of B and PL can be
discerned in the recent cases. Of course, federal court decisions are
likely to rest not on a determination of whether negligence occurred, or on the court's ability to make such a determination, but
rather on the presence or absence of discretion. There is no discretion, for example, to confine federal prisoners in facilities that are
so inadequate that they cannot be adequately protected from foreseeable assaults by other federal prisoners; the government does
not avoid this duty by negligently contracting with the keeper of a
substandard, dangerous, and perhaps unconstitutional jail.132 Similarly, when the government knows that a person's home is in danger because a dangerous suspect has stated that the plaintiff will
never testify against him, there is no discretion not to provide police protection for the person.' 3 Liability determinations in those
cases would not change if there were no discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
E. Medical Malpractice
In the area of medical malpractice, there is little reason to rely
on the presence of discretion to exempt the government from liability for the acts of physicians in its employ, one court having
gone so far as to say that "[n]o further leeway is required for the
publicly employed doctor or the public hospital than for their private counterparts.' 3 4 Certainly the sizeable experience of courts
See Brown v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 723, 728-29 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
Compare Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (duty
to protect government agent arises when government learns of facts leading to reasonable
belief that agent endangered as result of performance of job) with Peck v. United States,
470 F. Supp. 1003, 1016-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no special relationship between FBI and freedom riders so no duty to provide protection). The Peck court's analysis turned entirely on
the question of duty; discretion was not a factor. See Peck, 470 F. Supp. at 1017.
134 Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir. 1977) (quoting Spencer v. General
132
133
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with medical malpractice cases amply demonstrates that the judiciary perceives that it is able to say when liability for negligence
should exist. The discretionary function exception does not change
this. 135 Likewise, decisions concerning informed consent should not
be immune from liability because they do not fall within the discretionary function exception.' 3 6
In Hendry v. United States,'3 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested factors that have proved relevant in reaching a determination of whether a decision of a medical official was discretionary. "First, it is pertinent to inquire
whether the complaint attacks on the one hand the nature of [the]
rules which a government agency has formulated, or on the other
hand the way in which these rules are applied."' 138 Other factors
include whether state law standards can adequately evaluate the
Hospital, 425 F.2d 479, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., concurring)). See generally Harr v.
United States, 705 F.2d 500, 505-06 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (substandard medical or administrative
conduct not discretionary); Beins v. United States, 695 F.2d 591, 604-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(same); Supchak v. United States, 365 F.2d 844, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1966) (claim based on negligent medical examination and failure to admit to hospital not clearly within discretionary
exception); Santa v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D.P.R. 1966) (no discretion to
move heart attack victim to psychiatric hospital).
15 See Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1983) (decisions made
by government doctors on daily basis on "operational" level not within discretionary function exception); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir. 1977) (common law of malpractice applied to private doctors and hospitals grants leeway properly left for expert judgment in relatively stringent requirements upon plaintiffs), citing Spencer v. General
Hospital, 425 F.2d 479, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., concurring); Hendry v. United
States, 418 F.2d 774, 782 (2d Cir. 1969) (psychiatric examination determinative of whether
license would be granted); Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723, 724 (5th Cir. 1950) (decision to provide medical care to dependents of military personnel discretionary but no discretion to perform care negligently); Grigalauskas v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 543, 548 (D.
Mass. 1951) (same), afi'd, 195 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1952).
' See, e.g., Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (State Department's nondisclosure of risks of innoculation not within discretionary function
exception).
137418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
138Id. at 782; see also Duncan v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (D.D.C. 1973)
(discretionary function exemption should not affect mantle of protection for negligent revocation of airman medical certificate by FAA based on medical information). But see Beins v.
United States, 695 F.2d 591, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (doctor's determination that pilot's
ailment would hinder performance discretionary within section 2680(h)); Dugan v. United
States, 147 F. Supp. 674, 676 (D.D.C. 1956) (since decision discretionary when inmates detained, no responsibility for failure of officers and agents of hospital to prevent assault by
other inmate).
The validity of government regulations cannot be challenged in a tort suit. See Baker v.
United States, 226 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (S.D. Iowa 1964) (policy of fostering minimum restraint of mental patients discretionary but application of policy to individual case not discretionary), afl'd, 343 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1965).
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course of action contemplated by a federal statute or regulation, as
well as public policy.13 9 Questions that are political should be
shielded from court review because courts are not capable of evaluating such decisions against standards with which they are familiar, 140 and the same is true of policy decisions. The relative values
of B, P, and L in such.instances are immeasurable. Nevertheless,
even application of a policy to an individual case is not discretionary when it involves substandard professional conduct.' 4,
F. Right of Privacy
In this century, the common law has recognized a right to pri43
vacy. 1 42 While this right can be invaded in four distinct ways,' it
appears that the government has done so only by "unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another.' ' 44 The discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act is not a greater
barrier to recovery for invasion of privacy than it would be in any
other case. A number of cases brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act involving the FBI and the CIA have brought into question the opening of mail by these two agencies; opening private
45
mail is an invasion of privacy at common law.
Hendry, 418 F.2d at 783. The Hendry court noted:
This is not to imply that state tort standards, designed to remedy private wrongs,
cannot apply to uniquely governmental decisions. However, state tort standards
cannot adequately control those governmental decisions in which, to be effective,
the decision-maker must look to considerations of public policy and not merely to
established professional standards or to standards of general reasonableness.

'"

Id.

140 Id.
In Hendry, the court found that there was no discretion, but also found that no
duty was breached. Id. at 784-85.
14 See White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13, 17 (4th Cir. 1963) (no discretion for negligent application of VA policy allowing psychiatric patients maximum independence when
patient previously displayed suicidal tendencies).
142 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A comment a (1977).
141 Id.
at § 652A (2). The four means of invading privacy noted by the RESTATEMENT are
"unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another," "appropriation of the other's name
or likeness," "unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life," or "publicity that
unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public." Id.
144 The infiltration and disruption of a political party might also be considered to be
activity analogous to an intrusion upon seclusion except that any right would not be an
individual one, but rather a right held by a group. One court held that such activities carried out by the government are actionable and not shielded from liability by the discretionary function exemption. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 463
F. Supp. 515, 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (disruption of political party by FBI; prima facie tort
claim stated under New York law; program of disruption beyond agency's authority).
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652B comment b (1977).
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In Birnbaum v. United States,14 6 the CIA had opened and

read plaintiffs' mail to and from the Soviet Union, pursuant to a
program that had existed for several years. Plaintiffs' mail was
shared with the FBI. In an action brought for invasion of privacy,
the government contended that it could not be held liable because
the mail-opening activities fell within the discretionary function
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The federal district
court, however, held that the discretionary function exception did
not apply because "[t]here is no discretion under our system to
conceive, plan and execute an illegal program.1147 The United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this holding and noted that "[a] discretionary function can derive only from
properly delegated authority.... An act that is clearly outside the
authority delegated cannot be considered as an 'abuse of discretion.' "148 The CIA acted far beyond its authority and so the decision to open another's mail could not have been a permissible exer1 49

cise of discretion.

Certainly the decision to initiate and execute a program of
opening certain mail is a policy-making decision. Nevertheless, the
courts perceive that they are competent to assess the relative values of B, P, and L when L consists of such an intrusion upon seclusion. Once such competence is asserted, a mail-opening case is no
different from a common law case of intrusion upon seclusion.
1 50
Other cases are in accord.

G. Negligent Performance of Services or Activities Undertaken
The common law ordinarily would not impose a duty upon a
defendant to aid or protect another absent some special circumstance. 51 But once the defendant undertakes to perform services
for another that are necessary for his protection he is liable for
physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care, if
the risk of harm is increased or if harm is suffered because of the
588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
'17 Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 973-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 588
146

F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
'4' Birnbaum, 588 F.2d at 329 (citations omitted).
149 Id.
at 332.
"8 See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 463 F.
Supp. 515, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 944 (D. Conn.
1977); Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Hawaii 1977).
381 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1977).
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other's reliance. 15 The same is true with3 respect to injured third
5
persons who relied on the undertaking.'
Construction of the discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act mirrors these common law rules. When
there is no undertaking, the discretionary function exception
shields the government from liability,15 4 but when there is an undertaking, the discretionary function exception is not a bar to
liability.
The leading case on this point is Indian Towing Co. v. United
States.'5 5 In Indian Towing, the United States Coast Guard undertook to provide lighthouse services, but the light failed and plaintiffs suffered damages as a result. The inapplicability of the discretionary function exception was assumed by the parties
themselves,' 56 and the United States Supreme Court agreed that
57
assumption of duty was the critical factor.'
The rationale of Indian Towing has been extended to other
mishaps on navigable waters,' 8 as well as to other activities of the
152 Id.

at § 323.

,53 See id. at § 324A.
,54 See Denny v. United States, 171 F.2d 365, 366 (5th Cir. 1948) (determination not to
provide medical care discretionary, therefore no undertaking), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919
(1949); Miller v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 1129, 1131 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (dictum) (decision to place person in witness protection program discretionary), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1448,
1449 (3d Cir. 1984); Medley v. United States, 543 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(decision to place particular air route on navigation map discretionary); Williams v. United
States, 504 F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (decision to predict weather discretionary); cf.
Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1018, 1023-24 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (mem.) (no undertaking to warn mariners of all dangers at sea, especially political-military hazards, therefore, omission of warning within discretionary function exception).
155 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
186 Id. at 64.
157 Id. at 69. The Court stated:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised
its discretion to operate a light... and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light
was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then
the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to
repair the light or give warning that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard
failed in its duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States
is liable under the Tort Claims Act.
Id.
158 See, e.g., Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.) (demarcation of ship
wreck), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1979); United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp.,
372 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir.) (ill-equipped coast guard rescue ship), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836
(1967); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951) (placement
of warning buoy).
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government. 159 Of course, the rationale can be applied only when a
court can evaluate the actions of the government against the negligence standard; it must be possible to make some estimation of the
relative values of B, P, and L.160 For example, the acts and omissions of air traffic controllers are not immune from liability under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.16 1 There is no discretion to perform
medical treatment negligently, once it has been undertaken.126
When the government contracts with local political subdivisions
for the confinement of federal prisoners, there is no discretion to
choose contractors who maintain a "substandard, dangerous, and
perhaps unconstitutional jail.1 63 Once the government takes con16 4
trol of a bank, there is no discretion to operate it negligently.
After establishing medical standards for certification as an airline
pilot, the government has no discretion to apply those standards
negligently 5 When "the Government devises and instructs as to a
dangerous procedure, it is liable for the negligent direction
thereof."1"6 If the government decides to erect a road block, there
1 67
is no discretion to do so negligently.
The discretionary function exception does not affect the government's obligation in these situations. When there is no under159See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057, 1063 (5th Cir. 1984) (repair of
seawall); Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1983) (implementation of
decision to prosecute); Peterson v. United States, 673 F.2d 237, 240 (8th Cir. 1982) (flying at
low altitudes).
,60 Cf. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 876-77 (10th Cir.
1984) (because FAA regulations for establishment of terminal control areas contained no
"fixed or readily ascertainable standard," decisions discretionary); Rulli v. United States,
581 F. Supp. 1502, 1511 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (inspections of nonfederal airports involved professional or scientific rather than policy-oriented judgment), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3823
(1986).
1" See, e.g., Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 931 (1967); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75 (D.C. Cir.
1955), rev'd mem. on other grounds, 350 U.S. 907, modified and remanded on other
grounds, 350 U.S. 962 (1956); Tilley v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 696, 701 (D.S.C.
1966); cf. Allnutt v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 832, 838 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Sullivan v.
United States, 299 F. Supp. 621, 625-26 (N.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 411 F.2d 794
(5th Cir. 1969).
162 See Hunter v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 411, 413 (M.D. Tenn. 1964); Dishman v.
United States, 93 F. Supp. 567, 571 (D. Md. 1950); cf. Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d
475, 483 (5th Cir. 1982) (psychiatric services rendered to prisoner).
M, Brown v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 723, 728-29 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
I" 'In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 445 F. Supp. 723, 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
185See Duncan v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (D.D.C. 1973) (FAA activity).
116 See Aretz v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 260, 302 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 604 F.2d 417
(5th Cir. 1979).
M67
See Hernandez v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Hawaii 1953).
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taking, there is discretion. When there is an undertaking, there is
no discretion. Of course the determination of whether there has
been an undertaking is not always easily made, yet is often dispositive of the outcome. Since that is true of common law negligence
cases as well, little is added by bringing the discretionary function
exception into these cases.
H. Water and Flood Control
The diversion of surface waters is a problem that has generated inconsistent rules among the states. Under the common enemy doctrine, a landowner is permitted to dispose of surface waters from his land without liability to others. But under the civil
law rule followed by many states, a landowner is entitled to have
the natural drainage of surface waters maintained. 168 Diversion of
surface waters by agencies of the federal government has taken
several forms, including flood control. Consideration of flood control activities necessitates an assessment of the interest of adjoining landowners as well as that of the public. Incorporation of the
public interest into a negligence analysis, however, has proved difficult because courts are unable to assess the relative values of B,
P, and L. Until this changes, and it will change, federal courts will
refrain from passing upon the reasonableness of government activity in flood control projects. This restraint would occur with or
without the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
69
The leading case on flood control is Coates v. United States.
In Coates, various government agencies decided to create an avenue for waterway transportation by changing the flow, current,
channel, banks, and course of the Missouri River. This alteration
resulted in extensive damage to the plaintiff's crops because a
newly created water current passed over the plaintiff's land. He
brought an action claiming damages for negligently altering the
course of the Missouri River. The complaint was dismissed by the
'68 W. PROSSER & W. KEErON, supra note 9, at 623 n.55 (citation omitted); see Reid v.
Gwinnett County, 242 Ga. 88, 90, 249 S.E.2d 559, 560-61 (1982) (following civil rule); Seminole County v. Merty, 415 So. 2d 1286, 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (injunction for water
damages against county allowed under civil rule), petition denied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla
1982); Drainage Dist. v. Village of Green Valley, 69 Ill. App. 3d 330, 335, 387 N.E.2d 422,
425-26 (3d Dist. 1979) (municipality must compensate for increased burden of surface water
damages).
9 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
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federal district court; the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Officials who have the power to consider projects on the scale
of altering the course of the Missouri River, however, do not have
their decisions immunized from liability by the fact that these decisions are somehow special or involve a massive undertaking.
Rather, when the appropriate officials exercise their prerogatives,
they consider a public interest that is so substantial that B, P, and
L are altered beyond recognition. Those decisions are immune because courts are not capable of assessing in even the roughest
sense, the relative values of B, P, and L. 170 Not surprisingly, flood
and water control projects have often been held to entail the exercise of discretionary functions and so are immune from liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act."" But this can change as can
the common law.
Efforts to control the flow of water on a smaller scale led to a
different result in the case of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v.
United States.17 2 In Seaboard, a drainage system was installed
around an aviation center owned by the United States. The system
undermined plaintiff's railroad, causing a derailment. In an action
brought by the railroad seeking recovery for damages to its railroad cars, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that there was no discretion in the construction of a drainage
system.17 3 Seaboard of course did not involve a flood control or
even a large scale water control project. Hence, the same public
interest was not weighed by the court in reaching its conclusion.
Without a public interest of great magnitude, B, P, and L are not
170

See id. at 818; see also In re Ohio River Disaster Litig., 579 F. Supp. 1273, 1281

(S.D. Ohio 1984) (fixed standards of engineering or technical expertise key to determination
of discretion).
171 See, e.g., Spillway Marina, Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1971)
(discretionary decision to erect dam as well as to release stored water because latter directly
related to objectives of former); Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. Co. v. Marsh, 577 F. Supp. 798,
809 (C.D. Cal.) (administrative decision to dam or release water discretionary), aff'd, 746
F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1984); Miller v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 612, 620 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(official decisions and directives requiring lake levels to be maintained within a certain
range discretionary); see also Hearings on H.R. 5373 & H.R. 6463 Before House Comm. on
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (Congress specifically recognizing flood control as within discretionary function exception).
172 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
173 Id. at 716 (government no longer exercising discretionary policy-making function,
therefore required to perform operational function of building drainage ditch in non-negligent manner). But see Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D. Alaska 1962) (highway plans causing floods result of policy judgment).
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the immeasurable elements they are in certain flood control
projects. Hence, there is less reason to defer to the discretion of
government officials.
In determining whether the United States should be liable for
its more substantial water and flood control activities, courts have
focused on the fact that the decisions involved in those projects
typically involved other branches of government. The courts concluded that such decisions must be discretionary. Actually, the
holdings turned on the competence of the courts to assess the relative values of B, P, and L. Government decisions of such magnitude typically are beyond what courts are able to evaluate by any
known objective standard. They are polycentric.17 4 When less ambitious projects are at issue and the public interest does not dwarf
all others, a court's ability to assess B, P, and L increases. Discretion disappears, as indeed it would in any negligence case.
L Approval of Design of ConstructionProjects
The question of whether one should be liable for the approval
of another's construction project arises most frequently in cases involving a government agency whose very approval is necessary for
the construction project to proceed. There is, however, a counterpart in the private sector and that is the approval of construction
projects by financing agencies.17 5 Without such approval, a construction project will not proceed. A suit may be brought by the
injured ultimate purchaser of a unit whose construction was financed by the agency, but there will be no recovery if the activities
of the lending institution go no further than to protect its own investment. On the other hand, if the activities go far beyond the
normal activities of a lender, a duty will be imposed on the lender
in favor of the ultimate purchaser, even though the lender does not
actually engage in construction.'
17' See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534-39 (1973) (decisions with many interrelated strands not appropriately evaluated by court).
175 See generally Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d
609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (financing institution held liable to third party purchasers of
home not in privity); Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE
L.J. 1271, 1293-94 (1966) (association developers willing to construct quality structures only
if it returns high yields); Comment, Financing of Building Construction: Liability for
Structure Defects, 10 B.C.L. REv. 932 (1969) (discussing legal foundation and ramifications
of Connor decision).
"' Compare Wierzbicki v. Alaska Mut. Say. Bank, 630 P.2d 998, 1001 (Alaska 1981)
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Cases involving governmental approval of construction
projects demonstrate that the concepts of "duty" and "discretion"
are closely related, so much so that if one exists, the other does not
exist. 177 In such cases, courts frequently answer contentions concerning discretion in terms of whether a duty exists. In other cases,
courts consider the issue of duty and discretion separately, but the
ultimate outcomes of such cases would be no different if the applicability of the discretionary function were not considered at all.
In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation17 concerned the collapse of a bridge over a river flowing between Ohio and West Virginia. A number of deaths resulted. United States Engineers had
made a crossing survey and had approved the design and construction of the bridge. In wrongful death actions brought against the
United States, the plaintiffs alleged that there was actionable negligence on the part of the government in its approval and survey of
the bridge and that this negligence was a direct cause of the
deaths.
The federal district court held that the activities or omissions
of the Chief of Engineers were within the discretionary function
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act since those activities
(bank activity not intended to protect any interest beyond its security interest) [and] Murry
v. Western Am. Mort. Co., 124 Ariz. 387, 389, 604 P.2d 651, 653 (1980) (no activity beyond

realm of average construction lender) [and] Butts v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 152
Ga. App. 40, 42-43, 262 S.E.2d 230, 232-33 (1979) (quality control not primary purpose of

inspection for benefit of lender) [and] Callaizakis v. Astor Dev. Co., 4 I1. App. 3d 163, 171,
280 N.E.2d 512, 518 (1972) (inspections for usual purposes of money lender) with Conner v.

Great W. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (reversal of judgment for lender because of extensive activities in project). In Conner, the court
considered six factors in determining that a nonsuit should not have been granted in favor
of a financing institution and against the purchaser of a home: [1] Great Western's intention

to affect the plaintiffs significantly; [2] the foreseeability of the risk of harm to plaintiffs; [3]
the certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; [4] the close proximity of the connection
between Great Western's conduct and the injury suffered by plaintiffs; [5] the substantial
degree of moral blame attached to Great Western's conduct; and [6] the admonitory policy
of the law of torts, calling for the imposition of liability for this type of conduct. Id. at 86667, 447 P.2d at 617-18, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78.
'7 See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 730 F.2d 1434, 1436-37 (11th Cir. 1984) (Army

Corp. of Engineers not liable for flooding damages resulting from discretionary decision to
forego costly study concerning river redirection project); Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d
1057, 1063-64 (5th Cir. 1984) (Army Corp. of Engineers liable for negligent maintenance of
seawall after approval and acceptance of project); Seaboard Coast Line R.Rv. United

States, 473 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1973) (discretion to approve building of drainage ditch
but a duty to perform with due care).
17 381 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
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were at the "planning" rather than at the "operational" level.17 9
But while paying lip-service to the planning/operational "test," the
court in another section of its opinion gave considerably more attention to traditional tort analysis by asking whether defendant
owed any identifiable duty to these plaintiffs. The court held that
"whatever concerns Congress had with respect to commerce, such
as providing for bridge travel at a certain location, those concerns
did not include the structural safety of the bridge design for travelers over the bridge."' 180 The court found that there was neither
reliance on the part of the travelling public nor special knowledge
on the part of the Corps of Engineers that created a duty to inform
the builders of the bridge. Nor did the Engineers' power of inspection constitute such control that a duty was created. Cumulatively,
no duty was created by these special factors.'
Other courts have utilized this "duty" analysis in design approval cases when determining whether discretion was present by
finding that there was no failure to exercise reasonable care.8 2
When the connection between the alleged negligence in approving
a design and the injury of the plaintiff is not close, there is discretion;' 8 3 very likely the legislative purpose of a government program
was not to impose a duty on the government in favor of the injured
plaintiff. 8 4 Moreover, when the connection between unreasonable
179

Id. at 969.

::oId. at 960,61.
181Id. at 961-65.
182 See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 568 F.2d 153, 156, 158-59 (10th Cir. 1977) (federal
government not liable for approval and utilization of bridge design when bridge washed out
or for design of approach roads because state responsible for placement of bridge), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); United States v. Ure, 225 F.2d 709, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1955)
(when customary construction and inspection methods carried out without negligence, no
duty on part of federal government to insure that canal would not break because choice of
material used in construction discretionary); Valley Cattle Co. v. United States, 258 F.
Supp. 12, 19-20 (D. Hawaii 1966) (approval of construction site and design of rain culvert
discretionary).
183See Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 663 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939
(1983); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 119, 122 (S.D. Ill. 1983); Fireman's
Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 893, 895 (D. Or. 1979); cf. Patton v.
United States, 549 F. Supp. 36, 38 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (design of road was discretionary
function).
' See Highway Safety Act of 1976 § 402(c) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976)).
"Implementation of a highway safety program under this section shall not be construed to
. . .require compliance with every uniform standard, or with every element of every uniform standard, in every State." Id. Congress intended this provision to confer "broad discretionary authority upon the Secretary with respect to approval of State highway safety programs." H.R. REP. No. 716, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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conduct and injury is not close, courts are ill-equipped to make a
determination of the relative values of B, P, and L.
As the connection between the alleged negligence in approving
a particular design and the injury of the plaintiff gets closer, a duty
arises. When this occurs, the discretion of the government, which is
immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, disappears. Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp.185 is a case in point. In
Moyer, plaintiff's decedent was a test pilot who was killed when his
ejection seat fired while the airplane was still on the ground. Plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the United States because the
Technical Order requesting the modification of the seat was
drafted in a vague, ambiguous, and negligent manner. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the federal
district court's dismissal, which had been granted on the basis that
there was discretion in the drafting of the Technical Order. The
court of appeals said that while there was discretion in the Air
Force's selection of a particular type of airplane or in the determination of the number of such aircraft to be purchased, there was
no discretion to allow negligent design or construction that would
pose a safety hazard to an individual operating the aircraft.'- 6
Certainly there is not a close connection between the selection
of a particular type of aircraft and the ejection of a pilot at the
wrong time. However, the connection between specifications of an
ejection seat and the actual ejection of a pilot is much closer. For
this reason, the discretion of the United States is no longer immune.18 7 A court can perceive that it is capable of making an assessment of the relative values of B, P, and L in such a case.
NEws 798, 819; see also Rayford v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 1051, 1052 (M.D. Tenn.
1976) (passive role of U.S. in highway design, construction, approval and maintenance of
highway insufficient to cause liability under FTCA); Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713,
721, 724 (3d Cir.) (no duty to member of travelling public created by federal-aid highway
legislation), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1962); Delgadillo v. Elledge, 337 F. Supp. 827, 831-32
(E.D. Ark. 1972) (no duty to travelers due to federal laws relating to approval, inspections,
and maintenance). But see First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 119, 121-22 (S.D.
111. 1983) (Secretary of Transportation has discretion to reject highway construction plan
that fails to comply with statutory uniform standards).
185481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973).
186
Id. at 598.
187 See Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (method of
designing and installing modification to elevator control mechanism of airplane tail
assembly).
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J. Release of Prison Inmates or Mental Patients
That discretion can change and evolve is well illustrated by
the cases involving the release and supervision of mental patients
or prison inmates who later cause personal injury or death to a
member of the general public or to themselves. The common law
has recently recognized that a duty to warn or protect a third person threatened by the patient may be imposed on one who treats a
mental patient.18 8 In the treatment of mental patients or the housing of prisoners, the government runs the risk that the release of
such persons will permit injury to occur to a third person. Yet, the
government may make no effort to warn such persons.
The release of mental patients or prison inmates reflects a policy of how such persons should be cared for, and experts in the
field disagree on the appropriateness of this policy. Early cases
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act involving this fact pattern shield the government from liability by holding that the release and supervision decisions were discretionary in nature. 8 ' But
gradually, discretion has disappeared and a duty has emerged.
This change is not the result of courts distinguishing cases on their
facts, but the result of a changed perception of a court's ability to
assess the relative values of B, P, and L.
In the 1953 case of Smart v. United States, 90 a VA mental
patient was released unaccompanied for a trial visit to his home.
During the trip, he stole a car and crashed into plaintiff's automobile, causing injury. The court held that the decision to release the
patient from immediate custody and control for a trial visit was
discretionary,' 9 ' as was the decision to permit the patient to go
unaccompanied.

1 92

In vivid contrast to Smart is Underwood v. United States,93
decided in 1966. Underwood stands for the proposition that the
discharge of a mental patient without adequate consideration of
the patient's history by the releasing psychiatrists is actionable
negligence and not immune under the discretionary function ex188

Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. App. 3d 425, 439, 551

P.2d 334, 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1976); see Stone, The TarasoffDecision: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARv. L. REv. 358, 358 (1976).
1"9 Smart v. United States, 207 F.2d 841, 842-43 (10th Cir. 1953).
190207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953).
191Id. at 842-43.
192 Id. at 843.
13 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
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ception. Dunn, a serviceman with a history of mental problems,
was under the care of an Army psychiatrist who left the base.
Dunn's case and records were subsequently transferred to another
Army psychiatrist who, without adequately reviewing Dunn's record, released him to duty. Dunn obtained a .45 caliber pistol with
which he shot and killed his former wife. In a wrongful death action against the Army, the federal district court ruled that the decision of the medical officers to return Dunn to duty was not a
discretionary function. However, the court also determined that
there was no negligence on the part of the medical officers and no
causal relation between the release and the subsequent killing. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed that
there was no discretion to fail to transmit a complete history of
Dunn's mental illness from one psychiatrist to another,9 4 but reversed the determination that there was no actionable negligence
195
on the part of the United States.
A close reading of the opinions in Smart and Underwood
reveals that the Underwood court undertook a much closer examination of the factors that entered into the decision to release the
patient. Hence, the point at which an unreasonable act might be
found is easier to discern. 9 ' This analysis reflects a greater willingness on the part of the courts to evaluate the conduct of the government for its reasonableness and to make findings encompassing
determinations of the relative values of B, P, and L. 91 Because of
'9

Id. at 98.

9' The Underwood court had to distinguish United States v. Shively, 345 F.2d 294 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965), in which the same court had held that the negligent
issuance of a .45 caliber pistol by Army personnel to an off-duty sergeant in civilian clothes
in violation of regulations was not the proximate cause of injury to the sergeant's former
wife, whom the sergeant shot twice before taking his own life. The court in Underwood
distinguished Shively on the facts in that the sergeant in Shively had no history of mental
illness. Underwood, 356 F.2d at 99.
'19 Cf. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 368 (consideration of
how proximate cause arguments ought to be made). In some cases, a plaintiff effectively
argues a case in broad terms, contending that there should be a broad range of risks for
whose occurrence the defendant should be liable. A close examination of the chain of events
leading to liability is avoided. In other cases, a plaintiff more effectively argues a case in the
narrow terms of each little bit of conduct that contributes to the end result. In such cases,
there is apparently not a broad range of risks accompanying defendant's activity for which
he should be liable. Nevertheless, a close examination of the precise chain of causation
reveals that each aspect of defendant's conduct can be examined for its reasonableness.
Courts can do the same thing in explaining their conclusions concerning negligence as well
as in those concerning the presence or absence of discretion in a tort suit brought against
the government.
197 Cf. Chrite v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 341, 343 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Doyle v.
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this increased willingness of courts to examine conduct, the range
of government discretion diminishes.
A similar trend can be discerned in cases involving injuries
caused by released inmates. In Payton v. United States,198 the decision of a board of parole to release an inmate was deemed to
involve the exercise of quasi-judicial power according to the federal
district court. Hence, the government was immune from liability
under the discretionary function exception for any of the rapes,
maimings, or murders committed by the released convict. The
court applied a risk-benefit test 99 and determined that "[b]alanced against the possible harm to society the Board must have
considered the possible benefits accruing from parole to both the
prisoner and society.

' 20 0

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit stated that the "crux of the concept embodied in the discretionary function exemption is that of the separation of powers." 20 1 The court rejected the risk-benefit test and adopted what it
termed a "pragmatic interest analysis," 20 2 under which it considered three factors: (i) the interest of the injured party;2 3 (ii) the
government's interest;20 4 and (iii) the court's capacity to decide the
case. 20 5 Since the appellant's allegations attacked only the parole
United States, 530 F. Supp. 1278, 1283 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497
F. Supp. 185, 195 (D. Neb. 1980).
"10468 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Ala. 1979), rev'd, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981), decision on
rehearing,679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982). See generally Note, The Federal Parole Decision
and the DiscretionaryFunction Exception, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1121 (1983) (discussing Payton);
Comment, DiscretionaryFunction Exemption to the F.T.C.A.: Separationof Powers Concerns in Parole Release Decisions - Payton v. United States, 15 GA. L. REv. 1125 (1981)
(discussing Payton).
19 The risk-benefit test was stated in Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.
Tex. 1978). Gray involved a suit against the FDA for its approval of DES without giving any
warning of its harmful effects. See id. at 340.
200 Payton, 468 F. Supp. at 656.
200 Payton, 636 F.2d at 143; see Comment, supra note 193, at 1139 ("If sovereign immunity is viewed as a means of preserving separation of powers concerns, however, the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act makes sense").
202 Payton, 636 F.2d at 143.
102 Id. at 144. "The more serious, in terms of physical or mental impairment, and isolated the loss the closer the question becomes as to whether the individual can be expected
to absorb the loss as incident to an acceptable social or political risk of governmental activities." Id.
24 Id. The court must "assess the nature and quality of the governmental activity causing the injury." Id.
"The Court should consider, whether the vehicle of a tort suit provides the rele20I Id.
vant standard of care, be it professional or reasonableness, for the evaluation of the govern-
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board's application of guidelines to the released inmate and not
the guidelines themselves (the formulation of guidelines being
within the discretionary function exception) 206 the court held that
there was no discretion in this case. Drawing an analogy to the release of dangerous mental patients from hospitals or custody, the
court noted that a "tort suit utilizing either the reasonable man
standard or a professional
standard would appear to be the classic
207
vehicle for analysis.

Separation of powers may be the "crux" of the discretionary
function exception, but that separation immunizes quasi-judicial
decisions only to the point that a court perceives that it has the
capacity to assess the relative values of B, P, and L in the making
of that decision. Discretion decreases as this capacity is increasingly asserted. The results of these cases would have been no different had there not been a discretionary function exception to the
Federal Torts Claims Act.
K. Independent Contractorsand Nondelegable Duties
When the United States has engaged the services of an independent contractor, its liability to others has proved to be the
same as the liability of any private entity that engages the services
of an independent contractor. A number of fact patterns recur in
cases brought against private entities or against the government.
A person injured by the negligent act of an independent contractor may bring an action against the employer of the independent contractor on the ground that hiring that independent contractor was itself an act of negligence. Some common law decisions
draw a distinction between claims made by injured employees of
the independent contractor and those made by injured third persons, and deny the injured employee a claim, 08 leaving him to purmental decision." Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
206 Id. at 146-47.
207 Id. at 148. On rehearing, the en banc court did not consider the issue of separation
of powers. The Payton court instead focused its attention on the controlling statute, 18
U.S.C. § 4203(a) (1970), which states that the "parolee in the discretion of the board" shall
be allowed parole. Payton, 679 F.2d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 1982). The court stated that the
statute made the parole board's decision discretionary but did not "hold that the board has
the discretionary power to ignore the required steps of the decision-making process." Id.
The United States had an affirmative duty by virtue of a statute to examine the prisoner
since he had been alleged to be insane or of unsound mind or otherwise defective. Id. at 48283.
208 See, e.g., Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir.
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sue his remedy under the workmen's compensation systems of the
various states. 20 1 The cost of such compensation is an element of
the contract price. 210 The holdings of the courts when the government "negligently" selects an independent contractor are quite
similar, except the federal courts may base their conclusions on a
determination that the selection of an independent contractor is a
discretionary decision.2 11 This is not to say that the employer of an
independent contractor should be free from liability to an employee of the independent contractor when it is the employer's own
negligent conduct that has caused the injury. No special rules of
agency or of independent contractors are necessary to reach this
result. When a claim is made against the government as the employer of an independent contractor in such a situation, discretion
1977) (workers' compensation as exclusive remedy), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Johnson, 386 P.2d 698, 704 (Alaska 1963) (employer not liable where
independent contractor fails to make workers' compensation payments); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965) ("an employer is subject to liability for physical harm
to third persons caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and
careful contractor"). But see Holman v. State, 53 Cal. App. 3d 317, 336-37, 124 Cal. Rptr.
773, 785-86 (1975) (error to sustain demurrer to action brought by injured employee of independent contractor hired by state). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9,

at §§ 70, 71.
TORTS ch. 15 Special Note (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
"I Id.; see, e.g., Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288, 293 (2d Cir. 1966) (workmen's
compensation cost included in contract price), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935 (1967); cf. Blaber
v. United States 332 F.2d 629, 631 (2d Cir. 1964) (contract provided primary responsibility
for safety of employees on independent contractor). But see Aretz v. United States, 503 F.
Supp. 260, 288-89 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (under Georgia law, government cannot contract away
liability for negligence to independent contractor), aff'd, 604 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1979).
221 See, e.g., Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525, 529 (6th Cir.) (award of Government contracts entails discretion), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969); Hamman v. United
States, 267 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Mont. 1967)(distinguishing planning from operational activities); But cf. Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288, 293 n.4 (2d Cir. 1966) (when employee
of independent contractor killed, no recovery permitted by state law for negligent selection
of independent contractor, therefore no need to consider applicability of discretionary function exemption), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935 (1967).
In Toole v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a wrongful death action
was brought for the negligent hiring of decedent's employer, an independent contractor. The
federal district court refused to consider whether the hiring of decedent's employer was
negligent because the decision to hire that particular contractor was discretionary. Id. at
1222. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed without deciding
whether the hiring of an independent contractor is a discretionary act. Toole, 588 F.2d 403,
408 (3d Cir. 1978). Instead, the court applied Pennsylvania law and determined that state
law imposes on an employer of an independent contractor a duty to employees of the independent contractor when the contract requires particularly risky employment. Id. at 407.
But see Bramer v. United States, 595 F.2d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1979) (no nondelegable duty
owed by employer of independent contractor to employee of independent contractor).
209 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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is no shield to liability.2 12 Even when a claim is made by an injured
third person, on only very narrow grounds would the common law
impose liability on the employer of an independent contractor for
negligence in hiring. Recovery is available only if harm to the
plaintiff results "from some quality in the contractor which made
it negligent for the employer to entrust the work to him. 2 13 This is
a narrow exception to a general rule of non-liability.2 14 The same
conclusion can be reached when an action is brought against the
government, simply by giving discretion a correlatively broad
scope.21 5 On the other hand, if harm to a plaintiff does result from
the quality of the independent contractor that made it negligent
for the employer to entrust the work to him, then liability can be
imposed. In suits brought against the government the same result
is achieved by holding that engaging such an independent contractor is not a discretionary act.2 16
The common law provides that the employer of an independent contractor is liable for injury resulting from a peculiar unreasonable risk of harm if special precautions are not taken, unless
the contract between the employer and the independent contractor
denotes who must take the necessary precautions.2
When the
government employs an independent contractor, the same result is
reached by holding that the provisions of the contract result from
an exercise of immune discretion.2 18
At common law an employer of an independent contractor is
212

See Madison v. United States, 679 F.2d 736, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1982) (negligently per-

mitting independent contractor to conduct ultrahazardous activity without complying with
applicable safety regulations); Petznick v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 698, 703 (D. Neb.
1983) (permitting work on energized lines); McCormick v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 920,
923 (D. Minn.)(live wire exposed in government barracks where plaintiff, employee of independent contractor, injured whi~e painting barracks), appeal dismissed, 257 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1958); Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721, 733 (E.D. Tenn. 1955)(inadequate
precautions taken by government in furnishing high voltage power), aff'd, 235 F.2d 466 (6th

Cir. 1956).
212
214

§ 411 comment b (1965).
See Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 1982). A contracRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

tor has a duty to select a subcontractor with reasonable care. See id.; Deitz v. Jackson, 57
N.C. App. 275, 277, 291 S.E.2d 282, 284-85 (1982). An employer's duty to select a contractor
carefully is uniformly applied across the nation. Western Stock Center v. Sevit, 195 Colo.
372, 378, 578 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1978) (en banc).
215 See York Cove Corp. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 799, 809 (E.D. Va. 1970) (third
party claim against government for failure to control contractor dismissed as within discretionary exception).
216 See Brown v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 723, 729 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
217 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413(a) (1965).
2,8 See Scholz v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 111, 114 (D. Conn. 1967).
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liable to injured persons only if he maintains a certain degree of
control over the work. 21" The power to inspect would hardly
amount to the power to control. 220 Therefore, the government's
ongoing power to inspect work performed by an independent contractor does not lead to liability of the government when the work
is negligently done.2 21
In the area of independent contractors, the discretionary function exception does not affect what the outcome of cases would be
in its absence. In fact, the discretionary function exception has
served only as an alternative ground to reach the result that would
have prevailed simply by applying the common law.
L. Products Liability
The government does not engage extensively in the marketing
of products. However, there are occasions when the government
does undertake marketing functions quite similar to those undertaken in the private sector. On those occasions when injury occurs,
the liability of the government is the same as the liability of those
in the private sector, irrespective of what the Federal Tort Claims
Act says about the performance of discretionary functions, and irrespective of the fact that strict liability in tort cannot be the basis
for such liability.222 When the government provides a product to a
user, the discretionary function exception is no shield to liability if
the product is negligently designed.22 3
The government frequently undertakes labelling and inspection activities concerning private entities' manufacturing and selling of products. In so doing, the government occupies a role comparable to that of the third party endorser or warrantor of
products who can be held liable on the basis of negligent misrepresentation.2 24 Similar liability can be imposed on the government
19
220

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §

414 (1965).

Id. at comment c.

221 Irzyk v. United States, 412 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir. 1969); Aretz v. United States,

503 F. Supp. 260, 302 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 604 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1979); Blaber v. United
States, 212 F. Supp. 95, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), afl'd, 332 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1964); Hopson v.
United States, 136 F. Supp. 804, 811 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
222 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953).
223 Medley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (M.D. Ala. 1979) ("if the M-817
dump truck was negligently designed, the fact that federal employees designed it does not
immunize the government").
224 See, e.g., Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109, 118 (D.
Del. 1967) (negligent approval of design of fire extinguisher); Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276
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for negligent inspection or approval of products, irrespective of the
arguments that such activities are immune from liability because
they represent an exercise of discretion. When there is a professional standard of care that can be evaluated by a court, discretion
is absent.22 In such cases a court can assess the relative values of
B and PL.
There are some inspection and approval activities of the government for which there should be no liability. An applicable statute may simply provide for immunity, explicitly or implicitly, 22 6
and in such cases there is no need to rely upon the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Moreover, the
proper assessment of risks and benefits would result in a determination that the conduct is not negligent,2 27 whether termed discretionary22s or not.
The outcomes of the cases cited in this subsection do not depend on whether they are brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act or under the common law. The ability of courts to assess the
relative values of B, P, and L is determinative of their position
concerning the discretionary function.
M. Private Nuisance
There are occasions when the United States undertakes the
performance of certain activities which result in injury to an individual's quiet use and enjoyment of his land. A claim is then made
that the government should be liable for a private nuisance. In priCal. App. 2d 680, 683, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (1969) (negligent misrepresentation that shoes
of third party are "good ones").
225 See Loge v. United States, 662 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981) (failure to comply
with specific regulatory licensing requirements negligent), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982);
Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1974) (government liable for failure
to implement health regulations governing administration of polio vaccine when scientific
evaluation and no policy judgment involved).
226 See First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 552 F.2d 370, 375-77 (10th Cir.) (FDA given
discretion to make policy judgments in evaluating labelling by Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Gray v. United States, 445 F.
Supp. 337, 341 (S.D. Tex. 1978) ("the general character of the statutory standard imposed is
a direct indicator of the discretionary nature of the acts they demand.").
221 Cf. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1540 (1973) (courts not suitable bodies to
review conscious design choices of products because such decisions based on polycentric
considerations).
228 See Takacs v. Jump Shack, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (approval
of parachute rig involved "balancing of myriad of factors"); Gray v. United States, 445 F.
Supp. 337, 340 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (balancing risks and benefits discretionary).
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vate nuisance cases, the common law embodies a standard of reasonableness that imposes liability upon one who intentionally and
unreasonably invades a neighbor's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of his land.2 29 This involves a careful weighing of the
230
respective interests of the plaintiff and of the defendant.
When the government is the defendant, a remarkably similar
standard is applied by the court in evaluating the conduct of the
defendant for the presence of a discretionary function. Thus, for
example, the lengthening of a runway at an Air Force base that
causes erosion of plaintiff's land is not activity shielded from liability by section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act.23 ' The flying
of B-52 bombers at such a low altitude that they interfere with the
use of the land below is not discretionary. 23 2 When a substantial
public interest is involved, one that outweighs the sum of all competing private interests, courts can avoid the weighing process altogether simply by finding that a decision is discretionary. 2 3 Thus,
spraying a wildlife refuge with a dangerous herbicide to kill
growths that seriously endanger the food supply of wildlife as well
as to prevent the breeding of malaria mosquitoes is discretionary
even though damage to plaintiff's property results.23 4 The decision
regarding where to locate a drug treatment center is also discretionary .2"1 The outcomes in these cases would be no different if
there were no discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act because the interests pursued by the government would
simply outweigh the private interests in the quiet use and enjoyment of land. There would, in short, be no private nuisance.

229

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

822 (1979).

230 See id. at § 826.
2"1

See United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98, 101-105 (9th Cir. 1962).

232 See Peterson v. United States, 673 F.2d 237, 238-40 (8th Cir. 1982).
233 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 583 F.2d 857, 867-69 (6th Cir. 1978) (opening and

closing of dam gates covered by international agreement and falls within discretionary function of governments); Schubert v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 170, 171-72 (S.D. Tex. 1965)
(determination as to whether to use noise suppressors and when to make them available are
policy decisions and thus within exception).
234 Harris v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 298, 299 (E.D. Okla. 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 765,
767 (10th Cir. 1953). But see Motors Ins. Corp. v. Aviation Specialties, Inc., 304 F. Supp.
973, 977 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (government liable for negligent aerial insecticide spraying,
which caused damages to plaintiff's car paint).
"' Nernberg v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 752, 754 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 612 F.2d
574 (3d Cir. 1979).
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N. Misrepresentation
The Federal Tort Claims Act itself excepts from liability those
claims based upon a misrepresentation,3 6 which can take the form
of affirmatively making a false statement,2 3 7 or of failing to inform
when there is a duty to inform.23 8 Misrepresentation itself is a conceptual notion, the parameters of which differ depending upon who
is applying the term. In fact, the misrepresentation torts can be
considered very broad,2 39 but certainly such considered judgment
does not control the scope of the misrepresentation exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act. Hence, some misrepresentation cases
involving the government are decided on another basis.240 When
the government is involved as a defendant, an invitation to apply
the discretionary exception function may be made.241 However, the
236 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9,
at § 131 (discussing types of misrepresentations included within statutory exception).
237 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1965).
238 See id. at § 551.
22' See Green, The Communicative Torts, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1975). This article begins:

The two great areas of tort law are based (1) affirmatively on the duty of care or
negatively on the failure to use care, and (2) affirmatively on the duty to inform or
negatively on the failure to give reliable information. The duty of care is for the
protection of the interests of personality and property from the risks of physical
injury; this protection is currently provided by the actions of trespass, nuisance,
negligence, and ultrahazardous activity, all of which have expanded the common
law trespassory actions. The duty to inform is primarily for the protection of relational interests against the risks of physical injury, appropriation, disparagement,
and false communications; these interests are currently protected by actions of
breach of contract and warranty, strict liability, deceit, defamation, and abuse of
process, all of which have expanded the communicative actions.
Id. at 1 (footnotes omitted). All of these torts do indeed involve an element of false representation. But it is doubtful that exception from government liability of misrepresentation
could have been meant to cover all of these torts. Hence some element of judgment remains
in determining exactly what conduct constitutes misrepresentation. See 2 L. JAYsON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS

§ 260.05, at 13-69 (1985) (misrepresentation exclusion of "Sec-

tion 2680(h) reaches a wide and ill-defined category of types of actions").
210 See, e.g., Ware v. United States, 626 F. 2d 1278, 1283 (5th Cir. 1980) (negligent
misdiagnosis of diseased cattle is not negligent misrepresentation under Federal Tort Claims
Act); James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 584 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (negligent performance of operational duty resulting in failure to inform job applicant of tumor discovered at
pre-employment examination not within misrepresentation exception).
241 See, e.g., General Pub. Util. Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239, 240 (3d Cir. 1984)
(responding to allegations that Nuclear Regulatory Commission failed to warn of equipment
failure, government moved to dismiss asserting misrepresentation exemption and discretionary function), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1227 (1985); Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United
States, 724 F.2d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 1984) (misrepresentation exception and discretionary
function raised as defenses by government regarding mid-air collision of private planes in
F.A.A. controlled area); United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 392 (9th Cir. 1983) (ad-
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common law of misrepresentation (or deceit) also frequently provides the very considerations that are necessary to dispose of such
contentions.
At common law, liability for a negligently made misrepresentation is limited to that group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance the misrepresentation was intended,2 42 a limited group of
persons-far fewer in number than those who might "foreseeably"
be injured by the misrepresentation. 243 The same principle applies
when a person relies upon a misrepresentation negligently made by
the government, except that the same limitation on liability can be
stated in terms of discretion.2 4 4 Nor is there common law liability
for an inaccurate prediction that does not come true. 245 The government is not liable for inaccurate representations concerning future events, since such representations are considered discretionary. 246 The presence of the discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act does not affect the outcomes of these
cases in any way.
dressing claims of negligent failure to warn, government raised discretionary function and
misrepresentation exception defenses under Tort Claims Act); Brown v. United States, 599
F. Supp. 877, 888-90 (D. Mass. 1984) (charged with negligent weather forecasting, government claimed discretionary function and misrepresentation exception as defense).
242 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1977).
243 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448
(1931); Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N.Y. 511, 511, 139 N.E. 714, 714 (1923).
244 See, e.g., Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528-29, (7th Cir. 1980) (allegations
that government negligently issued fraudulent and misleading stock report unsuccessful because preparation of report within discretionary function), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981);
cf. Shirley v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1251, 1258 (D.S.C. 1984) (government's failure to
warn purchaser of rollover propensity of jeeps within discretionary function, therefore no
recovery).
245 See, e.g., Farwell v. Colonial Trust Co., 147 F.2d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 1906) (statements
that stock would be fully paid were "mere promises or prophecies concerning future events"
not constituting misrepresentation); Kennedy v. Flo-Tronics, 274 Minn. 324, 327, 143
N.W.2d 827, 831 (1966) (erroneous prediction that stock value would triple within year not
misrepresentation of fact); Campbell County v. Braun, 295 Ky. 96, 97, 174 S.W.2d 1, 2
(1943) (representation that one party will have nice buildings and lots on either side of
highway constitutes mere expression of opinion); see also Keeton, Fraud:Misrepresentations of Opinion, 21 MINN. L. REV. 643, 650 (1937) (individualistic attitude of common law
led to position that person should not rely on opinions of others).
246 See Builders Corp. of Am. v. United States, 320 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1963) (promise of anticipated need for army housing in remote area considered part of discretionary
function), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); Western Mercantile Co. v. United States, 111 F.
Supp. 799, 800 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (probable misrepresentation as to flood predictions considered discretionary), aff'd sub nom. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 278
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
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0. Adoption of Plans, Specifications, Regulations, Etc.
Rarely is the United States held liable for adopting (or failing
to adopt) plans, specifications, or regulations that result in injury;
quasi-legislative or quasi adjudicative actions of the government
agency are immune from liability.2 4 7 This is no doubt because governments are to govern, and they are to do so free from the fear of
liability. Hence, it is not surprising that the government will be
free of liability for adopting or failing to adopt plans, specifications, or regulations, 248 no matter how egregious the exercise of discretion, 24 1 as long as the action taken is not illegal 250 or beyond the
scope of the authority delegated by statute or regulation. 251 If the
regulation enacted by a government agency is lawful, the choice of
procedures to be followed in adopting that regulation is discretionary; if that choice of procedures does not comply with what is statutorily mandated, that choice is an abuse of discretion but still immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 52 The
analysis in traditional negligence terms would be fairly straightforward: there simply is no duty breached in such cases. Any duty
247 See Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (adoption of tris ban by CPSC); cf. Dupree v. United States, 247 F.2d 819, 825 (3d Cir. 1957)
(denial of security clearance by Commandant of Coast Guard).
"I Jayson, supra note 239, at § 249.05 at 12-127 (1985). Various regulatory activities of
government agencies have consistently been held by federal courts to be encompassed
within the discretionary function exception. Id. The legislative history to the discretionary
function section of the Federal Tort Claims Act indicates that acts of regulatory agencies
are "examples of those covered by the [discretionary] exception." Id.; see also United States
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 820 (1984)
(discretionary function plainly encompasses regulatory acts of government); Madison v.
United States, 679 F.2d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 1982) (promulgation of Department of Defense
Contractor's Safety Manual); Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir.
1981) (FAA failure to promulgate crashworthiness regulations).
2'49 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (1982) (discretionary function exception applies whether
or not discretion involved abused); Relf v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 423, 427-28 (D.D.C.
1977) (discretion applies to refusal to issue plans, specifications, or schedules of operations
for sterilization program of black females at ages of 12 and 14), affd mem., 593 F.2d 1371
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
250 See Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 973-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd, 588
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
251 See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 329 (2d Cir. 1978) (act outside scope
of authority not considered within discretionary function exception); United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 394 (9th Cir.) (no discretion to design flight procedures without
following directions of Secretary of Air Force), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
2152
See Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (failure
of CPSC to follow mandated procedures in promulgating tris ban not within scope of
FTCA); see also 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 239, at § 247, at 12-17 (1988) (discussing Jayvee;
discretionary function applies to procedures used to enact regulations).
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that exists is owed to the public and not to the individual member
of the public who happens to be injured by the non-negligent implementation of the plan, specification, or regulation. More to the
point, courts simply are ill-equipped to assess the relative values of
B, P, and L in such activity.
P. Obligations of Landowners

The common law imposed upon the landowner a duty to prevent injury to another according to the status of the one who was
injured. An increasing duty of care was owed depending on
whether the injured was a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. 53 More
recently, several states have abandoned these categories, and a
duty of reasonable care has been imposed, dependent upon all of
the circumstances.254 Cases decided under the Federal Tort Claims
Act are basically in accord, although the reasoning may be couched
in terms of discretion. Thus, there is no discretion not to put a
handrail on the steps of a post office building if reasonable care
requires that there be one. 255 There is no discretion to maintain
the Capitol Building negligently.2 56 The decision whether to warn
257
of known dangers or to provide safeguards is not discretionary.
On the other hand, a decision concerning the appropriate number
of guards in a government building was considered discretionary in
a case in which there was no duty under the circumstances to protect a member of the public, anyway. 258 The law of discretion in
this area has followed the common law.
153 See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, at §§ 58-61 (in depth discussion of categories of persons entering land).
254

See id. at § 62.

251 See American Exch. Bank v. United States, 257 F.2d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 1958) (deci-

sion whether to install handrails considered operational and not discretionary).
266 See McNamara v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D.D.C. 1961) (standard of
building maintenance not considered discretionary).
217 See Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 877 (10th Cir. 1976) (landowner/government's failure to warn of "known dangers or to provide safe guards" not exercise of discretion); United States v. White, 211 F.2d 79, 82 (9th Cir. 1954) (failure to warn of hidden
danger not discretionary); Stephens v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 998, 1009 (C.D. InI. 1979)
(government's duty to warn of latent dangers not protected by discretionary function
exception).
2 Turner v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 317, 320-21 (D.D.C. 1979) (although plaintiff
beaten and robbed while in Department of Agriculture building, decision regarding number
of guards and degree of lighting discretionary).
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Q. Discretion as Surrogate for Contributory Fault of Plaintiff or
Absence of Negligence of Defendant
On occasion, the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act has been relied upon to disguise the fact that
plaintiff simply could not make a case, either because of the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant or because of the
existence of a defense in favor of the defendant.259 For example,
the issuance of a permit, in conformity with regulations, to operate
a motorcycle race in which plaintiff was subsequently injured is
not an unreasonable act, in contrast to the negligent laying out of
course markers.2 60 The failure to make studies to determine where
encroachment on private property would occur as the result of a
congressionally approved waterway project is not negligent when
the costs of such studies would exceed the cost of acquiring the
private property outright."' On the other hand, the visitor to Yellowstone Park who camped in an unauthorized area after paying
no admission for the privilege should be found contributorily negligent when a grizzly bear attacked and killed him.262 The United
States should be permitted to assume that knowledgeable purchasers of its surplus asbestos, sold without warning labels, have assumed the risks of hazards associated with asbestos exposure, including the risk of liability to employees of the purchasers.263 In
none of these cases would decisions concerning liability have been
different if there were no discretionary function exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
229 See, e.g., Carlyle v. United States, 674 F.2d 554, 556-57 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
failed to establish negligence in failure of Army to supervise recruits).
20 See Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979); cf. United
States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498, 502 (10th Cir.) (issuance of grazing permit), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 879 (1964); Lynch v. United States Dep't of the Army Corps of Eng'rs, 474 F.
Supp. 545, 551 (D. Md. 1978) (issuance of permit act of discretion), aff'd mem., 601 F.2d 581
(4th Cir. 1979).
26, See Payne v. United States, 730 F.2d 1434, 1437 (11th Cir. 1984).

212 See Martin v. United States, 546 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1976) (closing dump-sites
and transporting particular bear eighteen miles discretionary acts), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
906 (1977).
262 Cf. In re All Maine Asbestos Litig., 581 F. Supp. 963, 971 (D. Me. 1984) (since deci-

sion to sell without warnings avoids unnecessary costs, decision discretionary); Stewart v.
United States, 486 F. Supp. 178, 184 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (since decision to sell without warnings
involved weighing of economic and other policy factors, discretionary act).
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R. Inspections for Benefit of Third Person
A recurring fact pattern is one in which a plaintiff is injured
because an inspection for the direct benefit of another was per264
formed negligently. In Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., plaintiffs, construction workers, were injured when a cable in a construction hoist broke. They sued, among others, their employer's
workmen's compensation carrier, who had gratuitously undertaken
a safety inspection for the employer. The jury returned a sizeable
verdict against the carrier, but the state appellate court reversed.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed again and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, noting that the defendant insurance company had extensively advertised its gratuitous inspection program
and the benefits that accrued to its customers from the program. 265
Such services were performed for plaintiffs' employer 266 and failure
to comply with the safety inspector's urgent recommendations
could have lead to cancellation of insurance.2 61 The court
concluded:
[D]efendant did gratuitously undertake to make safety inspections and to render safety engineering services on the ...
project, and ... such inspections were planned, periodic and directed to the safety of the employees on the project. Under these
circumstances . . .duty devolved upon defendant,
owed to the
268
plaintiffs, to make its inspections with due care.
The court then rejected several of defendant's contentions and
concluded that defendant's liability to persons for whom it did not
believe it was performing the inspections extended to "such persons as defendant could reasonably have foreseen would be endangered as the result of negligent performance;" the court reached
this conclusion because "plaintiffs, as workmen on the project,
were the chief beneficiaries of the safety inspection and safety engineering services . . . . [D]efendant could reasonably have . . .
foreseen that they would be endangered by its failure to use due
care." 269 The court concluded that the jury could reasonably have
found that defendant's agent failed to exercise due care in the in264 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964)
265Id. at 79, 199 N.E.2d at 776.
266 Id. at 80, 199 N.E.2d at 777.
217Id. at 83, 199 N.E.2d at 778.
268 Id. (emphasis added).
269 Id. at 86, 199 N.E.2d at 779-80.

(court applied Florida law).
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spection of the construction hoist.27 0
The analysis of the court in this common law case rather
straight-forwardly turned upon the existence of duty and the exercise of due care. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a determination of whether there is discretion will turn on the same factors
that determine whether there is duty or failure to exercise reasonable care.
In Blessing v. United States27 1 plaintiffs asked the court to
impose liability for inspection undertakings comparable to those in
Nelson. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,272 "enacted for the purpose of reducing . . . work-related illnesses and
injuries, 2 7 3 authorizes OSHA inspectors to enter places of employment to inspect pertinent conditions. Plaintiffs who were injured
as the result of conditions that were permitted to continue after
OSHA inspections brought suit, contending that liability should be
imposed for a negligent inspection. The government contended
that it should be immune from liability by virtue of the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, arguing
that it performs a regulatory function when OSHA inspects a
workplace. The court responded:
Statutes, regulations, and discretionary functions, the subject
matter of § 2680(a), are, as a rule, manifestations of policy judgments made by the political branches. In our tripartite governmental structure, the courts generally have no substantive part to
play in such decisions. Rather, the judiciary confines itself - or,
under laws such as the FTCA's discretionary function exception,
is confined - to adjudication of facts based on discernible objective standards of law. In the context of tort actions, with which
we are here concerned, these objective standards are notably lacking when the question is not negligence but social wisdom, not
due care but political practicability, not reasonableness but economic expediency. Tort law simply furnishes an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social, political, or economic
210Id.

at 95, 199 N.E.2d at 784. Other courts confronted with facts similar to those in
Nelson have held that the immunity from suit that is given to employers by the workmen's
compensation act should be extended to the employer's insurer as well. See W. PROSSER, J.
WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 445 n.4.
2711

447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).

2-1

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).

212 Blessing, 447 F. Supp. at 1165.
274

Id. at 1165-66.
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The court further noted that the discretionary function "seems at
first to have been designed simply to incorporate the basic tenets
of judicial restraint and proper separation of powers. "276 The nature of a decision is what is important, and, when policy considerations are involved, judgment is immune from liability.2 7 7 The establishment of priorities in OSHA inspections would be a
discretionary 'function. 278 But, if policy decisions would have required inspection of the equipment that injured plaintiffs, there is
no discretion - even if professional judgment would dictate
noninspection. 27e Thus, if state law would permit imposition of liability in such situations, the discretionary function exception is no
bar to possible liability.
The net impact of Blessing is that liability for injury to a third
person is controlled by state law concerning liability for inspections made for the immediate benefit of one other than the one
who is injured.2 so Only when the nature of the decision involved
itself is a policy decision does the discretionary function exception
apply, 281 though its application does not change the outcome of a
case. When decisions concerning social wisdom, political practicability, and economic expediency are at issue, courts are certainly
:75Id. at 1170 (footnotes omitted).
7 Id.
at 1171.
277 See id. at 1177-78.
278 See id. at 1178-79 (establishment

of priorities

"involve[s]

balancing policy

considerations").
278 See id.at 1184-85 (professional discretion not equivalent to discretionary function
exception).
280 Cf. Hylin v. United States, 755 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1985); Thompson v. United
States, 592 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1979) (mere provision for government safety inspections does not impose liability on the government for failure to stop an activity due to failure to comply with safety standards); Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1144-45
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). But cf. Rulli v. United States, 581 F.
Supp. 1502, 1510-11 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (evaluative judgments in inspections were professional
or scientific, not policy-weighing); Barron v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 & n.3
(D. Hawaii 1979) (employee of independent contractor could recover from government,
which inspected worksite, was aware of safety problems but did nothing about them, and
had reserved general control over work), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 654 F.2d 644 (9th Cir.
1981).
8' See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 U.S. 797, 820 (1984) ("judicial intervention in policymaking" is what "discretionary
function was designed to prevent"); Rulli v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 1502, 1505 (W.D.
Pa. 1984) (governmental functions entailing policy judgment and decision making is "key to
the exceptions applicability"); Teich v. United States Gov't, 500 F. Supp. 891, 896 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (policy judgments involving public interest are discretionary functions).
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not capable of assessing the relative values of B, P, and L.

III.

SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing examination of a number of cases in which
the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act was construed, some conclusions can be drawn. In certain welldefined and recurring situations in which common law rules of negligence liability are fairly well crystallized, a finding of the presence or absence of discretion may be invoked by a court for the
purpose of making the same liability determination that would be
made by applying the common law directly. When competing interests of the parties have not necessarily been resolved to the
point of general acceptance or at least predictability, the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act is invoked to make liability determinations in the same manner as
other liability limiting considerations are invoked in ordinary negligence cases. Frequently, difficult questions of policy are involved,
and discretion is the device by which courts can beg the policy
question - just as common law courts beg difficult questions by
resorting to such terminology as foreseeability. Discretion, like
foreseeability,
is a term the decision-maker may "load up" or
282

"unload.,

In yet other situations, courts have long acknowledged that
certain functions of government must be immune. When a discretionary function rule is applied to cases involving such fact patterns, the results are the same as they would be under the common
law. Additionally, "discretion" does seem to vindicate the principle
of separation of powers; tort suits should not become a vehicle for
reviewing the judgment of coordinate branches of government.
The borad theme of the cases involving discretion is that a
court will judge only when it perceives that it is capable of assessing the relative values of B and PL in the conduct of the defendant,28 3 and that courts apply the same common law rules to the
282 See Green, The Wagon Mound No. 2 - ForeseeabilityRevised, 1967 UTAH L. REV.
197, 205-06 (1967) (foreseeability overloaded in Wagon Mound No. 2). See generally, W.
PROSSER & W. KrroN, supra note 9, at 274-76 (discussing the over-extended and confusing
use of the forseeability doctrine).
283 See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 111. In situations in which a government agency has
gone to great lengths to choose the best alternative available, a court may be reluctant to
step in and decide if there has been negligence. Id. Courts may also be adverse to interfering
when amounts involved are high, or when the possibility of liability in related areas is great.
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government as they apply to private party defendants. When
courts believe themselves to be capable of making a judgment concerning the relative values of B, P, and L, there is no discretion;
when they are not so capable, there is discretion. There are times
when the public interest is so substantial in a particular governmental decision that it dwarfs other interests to the point that the
relative values of B, P, and L cannot be ascertained; such a decision is discretionary.
When the ability of a court to make a relative assessment of B
and PL changes, discretion no longer bars recovery. Discretion is
the elastic concept that the doctrine of proximate cause is already
acknowledged to be. As the proximity of conduct and injury gets
closer, a court's ability to assess the relative values of B, P, and L
increases, the probability of government liability for project-approval activities increases, and discretion decreases. When a government agency plainly exceeds its delegated authority, courts may
assert the capability of assessing the relative values of B and PL.
This article has meted out little criticism for the decisions of
various courts, despite the fact that some cases may deserve criticism and that many groups of cases may be inconsistent with one
another. Rather, the purpose has been to discern the characteristic
manner in which all courts treat the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. That manner is equal to and
is equally as broad as the common law limitations of negligence
liability set forth in the doctrine of proximate cause.
IV.

LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES CONSTRUING THE

DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL TORT

CLAIMS ACT

In the leading cases of the United States Supreme Court considering the scope of the "discretionary function" exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the approach has proved to be remarkably similar to that of courts called upon to limit liability in the
garden variety tort case. These cases will be examined from the
perspective of demonstrating that the Court itself treats traditional negligence limitations of liability identically to the discretionary function exception.
Id. However, in deciding not to interfere, courts may be most influenced by their "lack [of]
experience and [of] standards in determining what is a 'reasonable and prudent government'." Id.
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A. Dalehite v. United States
In Dalehite v. United States, 84 the United States Supreme
Court decided - in terms that might easily have described proximate cause or a legal limitation of liability based upon policy in
any other negligence context - that certain acts of government
officials were discretionary in nature and therefore immune from
tort liability. Plaintiffs were injured as the result of a huge explosion of Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate (FGAN), which the
government had produced and distributed according to its own
specifications. Clay plus a mixture called prp was added to prevent
FGAN from caking through water absorption. The FGAN was then
grained to fertilizer specification and packed in six-ply paper bags.
The government had had substantial experience in producing and
handling FGAN. Extensive planning and arranging at the cabinet
level produced a plan in which private firms were to operate reactivated ordnance plants, subject to the direction, control, and approval of a Government Contracting Officer. Detailed specifications
were drafted, and army personnel were present at each plant to
assure that the specifications were followed.
The particular FGAN involved in Dalehite had been designated for shipment overseas and stored for three weeks before being loaded onto two ships at Texas City, Texas. Both of the ships
exploded, leveling much of the city and killing many people. In the
suit that followed, the government was charged with negligence for
having used an ingredient in fertilizer known to be explosive in
combination with other materials. Such material had been shipped
to a congested area without warning of its true nature. The United
States Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas
held that there was liability based upon negligent drafting and
adoption of the fertilizer export plan, specific negligence in the various phases of the manufacturing process, and negligent failure to
police the shipboard loading adequately. Although the Uihited
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, the United
States Supreme Court considered the case as one coming to it from
the district court unimpaired because of the nature of the decision
of the court of appeals.
The first part of the Supreme Court's decision was a consideration of the legislative history of the Federal Tort Claims Act in
2-

346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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general and the discretionary function exception to the waiver of
immunity in particular. Testimony before the House Committee
on the Judiciary indicated that cases excepted from tort claims by
a discretionary function exception would have been dismissed in
any event by judicial decision in the absence of such an exception.
285 There is thus in the legislative history a strong indication that
the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act adds nothing to the basic law of negligence as it would be applied in the context of a suit against the government. Quoting from
the legislative history, the Court held that the discretionary function exception is
intended to preclude any possibility that the bill might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government
growing out of an authorized activity, such as a flood control or
irrigation project, where no negligence on the part of any government agent is shown, and the only ground for the suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be
tortious ....
The bill is not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity of or provide a remedy on account of such
discretionary acts even though negligently performed or involving
28 6
an abuse of discretion.
The legislative history of the Federal Tort Claims Act examined by
the Court makes the discretionary function exception of the Act
the parallel of negligence itself. If discretion is present, there can
be no finding of negligence. If there is no finding of negligence,
there is discretion.
In the second part of its opinion, the Court ostensibly applied
appropriate considerations of the discretionary function exception
to the facts of the case, asserting that section 2680(a) reveals a
congressional intent "to except the acts here charged as negligence
from the authorization to sue. ' 287 The Court stated that the discretion excepted from liability is "the discretion of the executive or
the administrator to act according to [his] judgment of the best
course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American
law. '28 The Court offered the following explanation of why discre285 Id. at 27 (quoting Hearings, supra note 1, at 29) (statement of Francis M. Shea,

Assistant Attorney General).
28 Id. at 30 (quoting Hearings, supra note 1, at 33; S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7; H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (emphasis added)).
28:7Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 32.
288 Id. at 34.
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tion was present in this case and how its presence might be judged
in other cases:
[A]cts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.
If it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a) would fail at the time
it would be needed, that is, when a subordinate performs or fails
to perform a causal step, each action or nonaction being directed
by the superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion.289
This does not really constitute an explanation of when discretion is
present, but rather the rationalization of a conclusion already
reached.29 0 The Court admitted that it did not decide anything
with respect to discretion "apart from this case." Abstract statements about acts of subordinates carrying out the policy judgment
and decisions of superiors say nothing about what discretion is.
What the Court did, of course, was apply its own judgment on the
policy question of where the legal limitation of liability for a negligent action of government officials should lie.
In the third part of its opinion, the Court considered whether
certain specific acts were in fact negligent. It is, of course, rather
unusual for the United States Supreme Court to make such a determination. The manner in which it decided that certain conduct
is discretionary is instructive. The Court actually applied an economic model of negligence. 9 1 Initially, the Court addressed the
question of whether there should have been further testing of
FGAN to determine the possibility of an explosion and stated that
"[o]bviously, having manufactured and shipped the commodity
FGAN for more than three years without even minor accidents,
the need for further experimentation was a matter of discretion. ' ' 29 2 A history of low probability of injury is an indication that
288

290

Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted).
See W. PROSSER, J. WAu & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 364. In describing tests

for determining whether tort liability should be legally limited (that is, whether the doctrine
of proximate cause should cut off the liability of the defendant), the authors of that text say
the following of the various tests: "They do not help the court especially to reach a decision
on a case before it, but they do help substantially in explaining the decision after it has been
reached." Id.
Application of proximate cause tests involves reasoning backwards, from conclusion to
reasoning. The United States Supreme Court used "discretion" in the same way.
291 See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 41; see supra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
282 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 38 (emphasis added). The Court traced the prior government
experience with FGAN to demonstrate that matters of this type of governmental duty are
exempted from the Act. Query whether such actions are immune from liability because
there was no failure to exercise reasonable care or because such actions were in pursuance of
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P is to be accorded a relatively low value. In such a case, it is increasingly likely that B is more than PL. This is the same consideration that would be made in any other negligence case involving
an explosion of fertilizer. Having concluded that the decision not
to engage in further testing was not unreasonable, it follows, according to the Court, that the decision must have involved discretion. 293 This is reasoning backwards, from conclusion to rationale.
The Court then considered the specifically alleged negligent
acts, admittedly performed in accordance with plans adopted by
the Field Director of Ammunition Plants. The government had
specified the bagging temperature, the type of bagging, the labelling, and the prp coating so that caking would be avoided. Adoption of all these specifications involved judgment, which sometimes
was exercised with respect to matters that went to the very feasibility of the whole project. As for the possibility of lowering the
bagging temperature, the Court noted that it was known that there
was a trade-off between production costs and the temperature at
which FGAN was bagged. That trade-off was considered and the
decision was made not to lower the bagging temperature. 294 The

Court thus professed an inability to assess the relative values of B
and PL. Additionally, the labelling provisions for FGAN were
found to have been made at a discretionary level. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on ICC regulations that had dictated
the proper labels for this material 295 and not solely on discretion.
The Court also noted that:
The entirety of the evidence compels the view that FGAN was a
material that former experience showed could be handled safely
in the manner it was handled here. Even now no one has suggested that the ignition of FGAN was anything but a complex
result of the296 interacting factors of mass, heat, pressure, and
composition.

By indicating once again that the Government did not act unreasonably in any event, the Court equated the legal limitation of liability that passes under the name of proximate cause with the preexempted from the Act. Query whether such actions are immune from liability because
there was no failure to exercise reasonable care or because such actions were in pursuance of
a government policy adopted by the exercise of an appropriately high level of discretion.
'23 See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 38; infra note 314.
"9

See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 40-41.

"I See id. at 41-42.
296 Id. at 42.
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ordained conclusion that liability does not exist in this case because the decisions involved were discretionary. The Court characterized the decisions as planning-level decisions rather than operational-level decisions. 9 This has come to be an important
distinction in later applications of the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In the fourth part of its opinion, the Court addressed the
question of whether the Coast Guard was negligent in supervising
the storage of FGAN or in fighting the fire after it had started. The
Coast Guard had not regulated the storage or loading of FGAN.
The Court deemed this a matter of discretion and hence immune
from liability. 2 8 As for alleged negligence in fighting the fire, the
Court said the Federal Tort Claims Act "did not change the normal rule that an alleged failure or carelessness of public firemen
does not create private actionable rights." 291 The Court then referred to the law of torts and said that "if anything is doctrinally
sanctified in the law of torts it is the immunity of communities and
other public bodies for injuries due to fighting fire."30 0 Hence the
absence of discretion would not alter the outcome on this issue
since the limitation of liability imposed under traditional tort law

would dictate the same result.

301

Justice Jackson in dissent equated discretion with negligence.
He accurately indicated that discretion is an elastic concept
designed to serve certain ends:
Some theory of liability, some philosophy of the end to be served
by tightening or enlarging the circle of rights and remedies, is at
the root of any decision in novel situations when analogies are
equivocal and precedents are silent. So, we begin by avowing a
conception of the function of legal liability in cases such as30this
2
quite obviously at variance with the approach of the Court.
Jackson argued that tort law serves as an inducement to prudence. 3 Dalehite involved the shipment of a dangerous substance
19,See id.
98

See id at 43.

299 Id.

Id. at 44.
fifth part of the Court's opinion concerned the possibility of imposing absolute liability on the government. The Court held that such liability could not be imposed
under the Federal Torts Claims Act. See id. at 45.
302 Id. at 49 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing B. CARnozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 102
(1924) (emphasis original)).
303 Id. at 49 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
300

301 Id. The
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and conditions in the contemporary world have made the law of
torts impose a high duty of care when such substances are manufactured and then shipped.30 4 The fact that such a large explosion
occurred is a strong indication that there was negligence on the
part of the Government. A private corporation certainly would
have been held liable under the same circumstances. 5 Justice
Jackson then stated that discretion is a matter of policy, and that
policy is to protect through immunity those decisions which should
be shielded from liability in all events. He went on to say, however,
that "a policy adopted in the exercise of an immune discretion was
carried out carelessly by those in charge of detail. We cannot agree
that all the way down the line there is immunity for every balancing of care against cost, of safety against production, of warning
against silence." 306 Jackson correctly determined discretion to be
the word by which we allocate where the risk that certain decisions
will cause injury should fall:
[clourts have long recognized the public policy that [a government] official shall be controlled solely by the statutory or administrative mandate and not by the added threat of private damage
suits.. . . The exception clause of the Tort Claims Act protects
the public treasury where the common law would protect the
purse of the acting public official.
But many acts of government officials deal only with the
housekeeping side of federal activities. . . . In this area, there is
no good reason to stretch the legislative text to immunize the
Government or its officers from responsibility for their acts, if
done without appropriate care for the safety of others. Many official decisions even in this area may involve a nice balancing of
various considerations, but this is the same kind of balancing
which citizens do at their peril and we think it is not within the
exception of the statute.
The Government's negligence here was not in policy decisions
of a regulatory or governmental nature, but involved actions akin
to those of a private manufacturer, contractor, or shipper."'
The dissenters concluded that the government should have borne
the risk that injury would occur in Dalehite in the manner that it
Id. at
Id. at
10' Id. at
11 Id. at

51-53 (Jackson,
57 (Jackson, J.,
58 (Jackson, J.,
59-60 (Jackson,

J., dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
J., dissenting).
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did. The lengthy excerpts just quoted indicate an application of
the planning/operation test that simply reaches a result contrary
to that of the majority.
The factors that constitute discretion, articulated by either
Justice Reed for the majority or Justice Jackson in dissent, do not
differ substantially from the unarticulated factors that we call
proximate cause. Out of Dalehite came the increased concern of
lower courts whether decisions were made at the planning level or
at the operational level.
B. Indian Towing Co. v. United States and Rayonier, Inc. v.
United States
After Dalehite, the United States Supreme Court did little to
explain what discretion is. Rather, it simply passed upon the appropriate application of the Federal Tort Claims Act to certain situations. In this way, the Court treated discretion in the manner
that a state supreme court would treat a doctrine of proximate
cause. Those courts allow lower courts to apply very generalized
rules to concrete fact situations - and give guidance as to appropriate limitations only as a matter of review. Of course, the United
States Supreme Court provides such guidance only occasionally,
but this is sufficient. State supreme courts do not frequently reverse trial court decisions in negligence cases. By refusing to decide
Federal Tort Claims Act cases, the United States Supreme Court
gives the same effect to decisions of lower federal courts. Interestingly, most United States Supreme Court decisions involving the
discretionary function exception are reversals of lower court
°
decisions 30
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,30 9 the government
conceded that the discretionary function exception was not involved.3 10 The Court simply applied negligence principles to a case
in which the Coast Guard had caused damage by negligently oper308 See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (reversed court of appeals decision); Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (vacated court of appeals decision); Hatahley v. United States,
351 U.S. 173 (1956) (reversed court of appeals decision); Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (judgment of court of appeals reversed); Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (court affirmed court of appeals, reversed district court judgment). But see United States v. Union Trust Co. 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (affirmed court of
appeals decision).
309 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
310 Id. at 64.
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ating one of its lighthouses. The Court, therefore, refused to apply
the discretionary function exception to those functions considered
to be governmental in the sense that only the government performs them.31 1
In Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 12 plaintiff's lands were destroyed when, allegedly, the United States negligently permitted a
fire to start and then negligently failed to exercise its assumed responsibility to extinguish it properly. The United States Federal
District Court for the Western District of Washington and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed
plaintiff's claim stating that there was no recognized tort upon
which plaintiff could sue, that Washington state law would not impose liability in such a situation, and that Dalehite precluded liability. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the liability of the United States is not restricted to that of a municipal corporation at common law.3 13 Rather, the policy of the
Federal Tort Claims Act was clearly that in appropriate cases,
losses should be shifted from private individuals to the government
so that the resulting burden on each taxpayer would be relatively
slight. Congress apparently decided that this would be most fair
when the public as a whole benefits from the services performed by
government employees. 14
Clearly, the Rayonier Court has indicated that the Federal
Tort Claims Act permits to be done what any tort suit accomplishes: losses may be shifted in appropriate circumstances. This
determination was made without reference to the discretionary
function exception, although the Court did indicate that this suit
was not precluded by the Dalehite case.31 5 It is up to the courts to
determine when it is indeed appropriate to shift losses. The determination to be made in a suit against the government and the determination to be made in a suit against a private defendant are
not different determinations.
In neither Indian Towing nor Rayonier did the United States
Supreme Court make any effort to say what discretion is. Rather,
it simply brought lower courts into line with what it determined
discretion was not. In Dalehite, the Court stated the broad rule
31'See
312
313
314

id. at 67-68.
352 U.S. 315 (1957).
Id. at 319 (citing Indian Towing, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)).

Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319.

3" See id.
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that planning-level activities are discretionary functions and operational-level activities are not. Broad parameters of applications
were thus given to lower courts. The manner of application is only
gradually shaped by occasional Supreme Court pronouncements on
very specific matters. The common law of negligence works in the
same fashion.
D. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines)
The latest word from the United States Supreme Court concerning the scope of the discretionary function exception is the decision in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines). 1 The Court combined two cases for
decision in which, allegedly, the Federal Aviation Administration
negligently certified certain aircraft for use in commercial aviation.
In one case, a specific regulation was violated: waste receptacles
were not made of fire resistant materials nor covered for the purpose of containing possible fires.3 17 A mid-air fire broke out and
many passengers were killed. In the other case, a supplemental
type certificate was issued for the installation of a heater not in
compliance with applicable regulations.318 A mid-air fire broke out
and all occupants were killed. Suits were brought by several individuals and entities, and in both cases, the respective courts of appeals held that the discretionary function exception was not a bar
to recovery. The question before the Supreme Court was whether
the United States could be liable for negligent performance of certification activities by the Federal Aviation Administration. The
Court concluded that the discretionary function exception barred
liability.
The Court first examined the applicable legislation. Under the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Secretary of Transportation was
authorized to prescribe rules and regulations governing inspections
of aircraft; however, under the statutory scheme certain responsibilities for the safety of aircraft were to remain with the air carriers.3 19 The legislation established a multi-step certification pro316 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
117

Id. at 800-01.

728

Id.

at 802-03.

319 Id. at 804.
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cess, 3 2 in which the FAA acted as the Secretary's designee and
promulgated a comprehensive set of regulations. 21 Because the
FAA had far too few engineers to conduct necessary inspections
itself, the statute permitted the Secretary to delegate responsibilities to qualified private persons.2 2 Pursuant to regulation, such
persons were appointed, "typically employees of aircraft manufacturers who possess detailed knowledge of an aircraft's design based
upon their day-to-day involvement in its development. ' 323 These
persons acted as the surrogates of the FAA.
The Varig Airlines Court then turned its attention to the Federal Tort Claims Act and the discretionary function, and stated
that Dalehite still represents "a valid interpretation of the discretionary function exception. '324 "[I]t is the nature of the conduct,
rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary exception applies in a given case." The Court also noted
that the discretionary function exception "plainly was intended to
encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its
role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals," and that
Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative
and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. ' 325 As a
matter of fact, no FAA inspector actually inspected the items that
caused such severe damage in the two consolidated cases. 26 Essentially this is because of the type of inspection system that the FAA
instituted for certification purposes.
"The FAA certification process [was] founded upon a relatively simple notion: the duty to ensure that an aircraft conforms
to FAA safety regulations lies with the manufacturer and operator,
while the FAA retains the responsibility for policing compliance."
327 In essence, the decision of the FAA to institute a spot-check
system of inspection itself was challenged as well as the application
of that system to the particular facts of the case. 28 However, the
Court stated:
320

Id..

32

Id. at 804-05.
Id. at 807.

323

Id.

'2,

324
32
326
327

328

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

811-12.
814.
814-15.
816 (citation and footnotes omitted).
819-20.

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

1986]

[t]he FAA has determined that a program of "spot-checking"
manufacturers' compliance with minimum safety standards best
accommodates the goal of air transportation safety and the reality
of finite agency resources. Judicial intervention in such decisionmaking through private tort suits would require the courts to
"second-guess" the political, social, and economic judgments of
an agency exercising its regulatory function. It was precisely this
sort of judicial intervention in policymaking that
the discretion3 29
ary function exception was designed to prevent.
Likewise, execution of the spot-checking program in accordance
with agency directives is protected by the discretionary function
exception.33 Calculated risks were taken for the advancement of a
governmental purpose.3 31
The fact that the Court was willing to say that the nature of
conduct rather that the status of the actor governs the applicability of the discretionary function exception does represent something of a concession to Justice Jackson's dissenting view in
Dalehite. It also is consistent with the view that the applicability
of the discretionary function exception depends on a court's ability
to assess the relative values of B, P, and L. The ability to make
such an assessment does not depend upon the status of an actor. It
most certainly does depend upon the nature of the conduct.
Beyond this, Varig Airlines fits the mold of cases such as Indian Towing and Rayonier in that the Court says little more about
what discretion is other than to reaffirm Dalehite. In reaching its
holding, the Court relied extensively on aviation legislation. The
Court brought lower courts into line with its view on a particularly
vexing problem and in so doing, it reversed liability determinations
made by two courts of appeals.
V.

COMMENTS ON THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION

There has been no shortage of suggested "tests" by which to
determine whether the discretionary function exception should apply. Some of these tests have been sufficiently discredited so that
there is no reason to dwell upon them.3 2 The test of the discre"I Id. at 820.
330

Id.

331 Id.

332A list of discredited "tests" would include the "discretionary/ministerial" test, the
"governmental/proprietary" test, the "no analogous private liability" test, and the "rank of
the decisionmaker" test.
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tionary function exception that has demonstrated the greatest durability is the Dalehite "planning/operational levels" test. If a decision is made at the planning level, the government cannot be
held liable for it; if a decision is made at the operational level, the
government can be held liable for it. Unfortunately, the planning/
operational test is not one that provides meaningful guidance in
determining whether the discretionary function exception should
apply.3 3 3 "As an analytical tool. . . the distinction is of marginal
value in resolving all but the most obvious cases. 33 4 Yet the test
has remarkable durability, for at least two reasons. First, the
United States Supreme Court provided it, and hence, irrespective
of its wisdom, it is the law of the land.33 5 Second, and more importantly, the planning/operational test has proved to be sufficiently
flexible to encompass many considerations;31 more tests are created to determine whether a decision is made at the planning level
or at the operational level. When broad policy matters must be
considered, a decision is more apt to be considered made at the
planning level. 33 7 Adoption of the policy is the extent of the exercise of discretion; application of a policy is considered routine and
not the exercise of a discretionary function.338 Adoption of policy is
the test for planning level activity, which in turn is the test for the
exercise of discretion. These tests for the test are themselves subject to the criticism that they provide no answers to whether a decision is discretionary. Perhaps they do direct the thinking of one
who must decide, but they hardly provide certainty.
Recently, a number of commentators have advocated that the
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
should turn on the nature of the conduct or the decision evaluated
333Reynolds, supra note 4, at 104-05 (application of test requires large number of examples on whether negligence in choice of policy or negligence in carrying out policy caused
injury).
U4 Downs v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 713, 745 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
M'See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.")
336 See Comment, supra note 4, 49 J. AR LAW AND CoM. at 173. (planning/operational
test manipulated by courts "to achieve results consistent with... [largely unarticulated]
policy considerations... perceive[d]... [as] important"); Reynolds, supra note 4, at 128-32
(exclusion of policy matters from tort claims; distinction between formulation and implementation of policy).
3'7 See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 105.
3 Id. at 106.
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in the context of the lawsuit, 33 and more specifically on whether
that conduct or decision involves the formulation of policy.3 40 This

view, adopted by some courts,34 ' is no doubt superior to the cruder
tests previously advocated. It is designed to function in a manner
consistent with what Congress envisioned when it enacted the discretionary function exception. Various factors are to be considered
such as the ability of the court to evaluate the reasonableness of
the conduct or decision,3

42

the potential intrusion of the judiciary

into matters appropriately left to another branch of government,
the nature and seriousness of injury, and the relative worths of private and governmental interests.3

43

A test encompassing all these

factors is less subject to the criticism that it is too rigid and mechanistic, a criticism that has been levelled at other tests.
But even this test for discretion offers the illusion of more certainty than it can deliver. This is because claims made against the
government involve facts that constantly push the frontiers of tort
liability outward. As activities of government affect citizens more,
challenges to government conduct through tort claims can be expected to increase. What is a novel claim today will not be so novel
tomorrow. What is policy formulation today will be capable of judicial evaluation tomorrow. Activity which definitionally constitutes policy formulation is itself fluid and subject to redefinition.
Approval of the use of pesticides and substances such as agent orange or exposure of citizens to the dangers of nuclear radiation occurs as the result of policy decisions made at a time when little is
known about such activities. When more becomes known, such decisions are no longer considered to be policy decisions and the relative values of their B, P, and L are subjected to court evaluation.
Courts increasingly demonstrate a willingness to evaluate the rea31 See Harris & Schnepper, supra note 4, at 164 (1976); Note, DiscretionaryFunction
Exception: It is a Bar to Federal Jurisdiction?,1983 UTAH L. REv. 117, 124-25; Comment,
supra note 4, 2 Cur--SAhi. L. REv. at 399.
"I See Clark, supra note 4, at 42; Harris & Schnepper, supra note 4, at 164; Wilkins,

Tort Claims Against the State: Comparativeand CategoricalAnalysis of the Ohio Court of
Claims Act and Interpretationsof the Act in Tort Litigation Against the State, 28 CLEv.

ST. L. REV. 149, 201 (1979).
m' See, e.g., Downs, 522 F.2d at 997; Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d
Cir. 1974); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
342 See Neirn v. United States, 696 F.2d 1229, 1230 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 815 (1984); Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1982); Reynolds,
supra note 4, at 118.
'43 See Jaffe, supra note 4, at 219; Note, supra note 339, at 125 (citing Allen v. United
States, 527 F. Supp. 476 (D. Utah 1981)).
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sonableness of such specific types of conduct over time.3 41 This
willingness both explains the changing nature of the discretionary
function exception and provides a point of reference for a definition of what is discretionary at any point in time. Quite simply,
discretion disappears when a court feels capable of assessing the
relative values of B, P, and L.
The view that discretion is bounded only by a court's inability
to assess the relative values of B, P, and L is subject to the criticism that it provides no more certainty or predictability than other
tests or formulas. Yet that is the ultimate point to be made. Negligence suits, including those brought against the government, are
usually the result of unpredicted circumstances - at least when a
decision on either foreseeability or discretion is the most difficult.
''s45
"A rule for the unpredictable is itself a contradiction in terms.
There is no better test because "[t]he mule don't kick according to
no rule."' 40 The best tests of the discretionary function exception
are not those that provide ready but wrong results. Until the
United States Supreme Court passes upon a particular point, we
must be prepared to accept some inconsistency in results between
the courts.
In common law negligence cases, the jury plays a substantial
role in determining whether liability should be imposed upon a
particular defendant. The reasoning process of the jury is hidden
in the general verdict, which is reviewed for the assurance that it is
supported by "substantial evidence." Even if there is no jury, a
deferential standard of review ensures that apparent consistency is
achieved. This consistency is, however, illusory.3 47 There is no jury
'"
See, e.g., Grunnet v. United States, 730 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1984) (determining
factors of test: planning or operational level, evaluative ability of judiciary and effect on
government administration); Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975)
(court capable of evaluating reasonableness of conduct); Medley v. United States, 543 F.
Supp. 1211, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (court to use planning/operational test, evaluative ability
of judiciary and its effect on administration of government).
M"W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 28.
36 Id. at 32.
347 See Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 262 (1920):
The real objection to the special verdict is that it is an honest portrayal of the
truth, and the truth is too awkward a thing to fit the technical demands of the
record. The record must be absolutely flawless, but such a result is possible only
by concealing, not by excluding mistakes. This is the great technical merit of the
general verdict. It covers up all the shortcomings which frail human nature is unable to eliminate from the trial of a case. In the abysmal abstraction of the general
verdict concrete details are swallowed up, and the eye of the law, searching anxiously for the realization of the logical perfection, is satisfied. Li short, the general
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in Federal Tort Claims Act cases. 48 Much of the reasoning process
that would occur in a jury room or in the mind of a judge is openly
expressed in a written opinion addressing the question of whether
the discretionary function exception should apply. The inconsistency latent in all negligence cases is thus there for all to see. Because common law negligence cases are reviewed only for sufficiency of evidence, it is thought that consistency is achieved; when
the question of discretion is involved, consistency is expected, and
there is no mask to hide behind if it is not present. This factor is
compounded by the fact that liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act is determined by the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. 49
This inconsistency should not bother anyone any more than
the fact that latent inconsistencies are tolerated in negligence
cases. If improvement were possible, it would be sought. There is
no groundswell of support for extensive revision of the discretionary function exception.3 50 Rather, it should simply be accepted
that the limitations placed upon the government's liability under
the Federal Tort Claims Act's discretionary function exception
converge with the limitations imposed by the common law doctrine
of proximate cause. No more than that can be expected.

Id.

verdict is valued for what it does, not for what it is. It serves as the great procedural opiate, which draws the curtain upon human errors and soothes us with the
assurance that we have attained the unattainable.

I38 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982). One commentator recently advocated a right to a trial by
jury in cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Kirst, Jury Trial and the
Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh Amendment Right, 58 Tsx. L.
REV. 549 (1980).
349 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
15o See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 113 (1968) ("no great dissatisfaction with the Federal
Tort Claims Act as a whole").

